E-ISSN: 1116 - 3240 P-ISSN: 3026-9334
MPRI-JAIMR | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF AFRICAN INNOVATION & MULTIDSCIPLINARY RES.
VOL. 10 NO. 2 – OCTOBER, 2025

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND LOCAL REALITIES: A QUALITATIVE SYNTHESIS OF BOKO HARAM'S EVOLUTION, FINANCING, AND IMPACTS SINCE 2009

GEORGE THOMPSON SEKIBO; IROYE SAMUEL OPEYE; & OJO OLUSOLA MATTHEW

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, National Open University of Nigeria

DOI: https://doi.org/10.70382/mejaimr.v10i2.092

Abstract

Since 2009, Boko Haram, first referred to as Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad (JASDJ), meaning "Group of the People of the Sunna for Preaching and Jihad," has caused significant unrest in Nigeria, especially in the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. This report provides proof of global participation in the conspiracy related to the Boko Haram conflict in this area. The study examines historical data to assess the effects of the conflict, investigates conspiracy theories, and reveals both internal and external cooperation linked to Boko Haram. This study utilised a qualitative secondary data methodology, relying on previously collected information from diverse sources such as academic publications, governmental documents, news media, organisational archives, and historical records. The research findings indicate that the international community is actively engaged in the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's northeastern states. This study reveals the presence of conspiracy theories regarding Boko Haram's actions in the North-Eastern States, illuminating the intricate nature of the conflict. The study offers insights into the complex aspects of the Boko Haram insurgency, encompassing foreign involvement,

Keywords: Boko Haram, Insurgency, International Conspiracy, Northeastern States.

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Prof. A.I. Mteiye [MALAWI]

conspiracy theories, and economic effects, through a comprehensive review of historical data and secondary sources. The research demonstrated that the Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria has expanded into adjacent nations within the Lake Chad Basin, aided by pre-existing cultural and religious connections and associations with militant organisations in other areas.

Introduction

The North Eastern Region of Nigeria faces significant socio-economic difficulties, making it the most impoverished region in the country, with an alarming poverty rate of 72% and the greatest unemployment rate (Sani, 2021). The Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states have endured the most significant repercussions in the region, notably impacting rural communities (Tafida et al., 2023). The northern region of Adamawa State, encompassing the local government districts of Michika, Madagali, Mubi North, Mubi South, and Maiha, experienced considerable destruction owing to its adjacency to Sambisa Forest, the primary stronghold of the rebels.

From the administrations of Yar'adua to Buhari, the North-Eastern region of Nigeria and the country as a whole have encountered a succession of tumultuous events and problems. Since the inception of the Yar'adua administration in 2009, Nigeria has been ensnared in the turbulence of Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism, a considerable affliction that affects numerous nations globally. Boko Haram, originally designated as Jama'atu Ahl al-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad (JASDJ), translates to "Group of the People of the Sunna for Preaching and Jihad." Its pejorative appellation, Boko Haram, signifies "Western education is forbidden" in Hausa, illustrating its antagonism towards Western-style education (Adela, 2021). In 2015, JASDJ professed loyalty to the Islamic State, resulting in the designation of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) following Abubakar Shekau's allegiance to the Islamic State. Since launching its first offensive under Abubakar Shekau's leadership in September 2010 during Jonathan's administration, Boko Haram has escalated violence in northern Nigeria, primarily targeting government officials, security personnel, Muslim politicians, traditional Muslim leaders, and Christians (Babayo, 2021).

Although it began as a domestic insurrection in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, since August 2011, there have been increasing signs of transnational collaboration between Boko Haram and militant groups outside Nigerian territory, particularly in the border regions of Borno State, northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia, and several other countries within the Islamic domain. The organisation ascended to international prominence in August 2011 by executing an assault on the United Nations facility in Abuja, leading to the

deaths of twenty-three individuals. Some observers assert that Boko Haram has sought to form alliances (Comolli, 2015).

In areas where several nations own substantial subterranean oil reserves, there is a tendency to employ non-state armed groups as tools of state policy. Nigeria has shown scepticism regarding Chad and Niger's affiliations with a particular group of Boko Haram, while simultaneously reproaching Cameroon for its perceived insufficient measures against violent extremism within its territory (Comolli, 2015) in Omenma (2019). The historically tense relationship between Nigeria and its Francophone neighbours originated from conflicts around the ownership and utilisation of Lake Chad resources. The relative stability of oil-producing regions in Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, in contrast to the volatility of Nigeria's Niger Delta, makes the energy resources of Nigeria's neighbours less hazardous to utilise. Furthermore, the abrupt financial boon from oil income raises apprehensions. For example, Chad's Doba oilfield produces an estimated 300,000 barrels per day, Cameroon generates around $20.40 million in pipeline royalties, and Niger's economy gains from oil exploitation in Zinder and Agadem (Mitchell et al., 2012). These have heightened danger factors in the Lake Chad region, potentially exacerbating the Boko Haram insurgency.

Consequently, enquiries raised by academics such as Richard Murphy (2016) regarding whether oil, apart from poverty and ethno-religious factors, constitutes the fundamental ideology of Boko Haram, highlight the substantial natural resources, especially oil and gas, in the Lake Chad region, amidst disputes among bordering nations. Furthermore, Ibrahim Shettima's concerns about Cameroon's extensive oil extraction near the Nigerian border underscore the potential for an international conspiracy to exploit oil resources, as evidenced by the assault on the Nigerian oil exploration team in the Lake Chad basin and the ongoing oil and gas exploitation by Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in the area (Omenman, 2019).

Various theories have emerged, including the perspective within the Christian community in southern Nigeria, which posits that Boko Haram is manipulated by discontented northern Muslim politicians seeking to undermine a southern Christian president (Agbiboa, 2015), as articulated by Nigerian Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka during a traditional African Studies discussion at Oxford University. In contrast, in the northern region of the country and within the Muslim community, a conspiracy theory suggests that Boko Haram's actions are not motivated by Muslims, but rather by opponents of Islam aiming to damage the religion's reputation. A conspiracy theory widespread in the

north asserts that President Goodluck Jonathan's administration financed Boko Haram, either to cast Islam in a poor light or to diminish the northern population in preparation for the 2015 elections. Among these locally generated conspiracy theories is the claim that Boko Haram has ties to the United States, as two studies by American organisations predicted Nigeria's collapse by 2015 and 2030, respectively (Adesoji, 2020).

This complexity has engendered numerous suspicions on all sides, which have at times escalated into fully developed conspiracy theories (Dennis, 2019). Consequently, it becomes progressively challenging to confine the Boko Haram insurgency to a simple national ethnoreligious revolt without acknowledging its regional and international political and economic implications.

Statement of the Problem

In areas where several nations own substantial subterranean oil reserves, there is a tendency to employ non-state armed groups as tools of state policy. Nigeria has articulated scepticism regarding Chad and Niger's affiliations with a Boko Haram group, while simultaneously reproaching Cameroon for its perceived insufficient measures against violent extremism domestically (Comolli, 2015) in Omenma (2019). The historically tense relationship between Nigeria and its Francophone neighbours originated from conflicts around the ownership and utilisation of Lake Chad's resources. The relative stability of oil-producing communities in Cameroon, Niger, and Chad, in contrast to the volatility of Nigeria's Niger Delta, makes energy resources from Nigeria's neighbours less hazardous to utilise. Furthermore, the abrupt economic boon from oil wealth raises apprehensions. Chad's Doba oilfield produces roughly 300,000 barrels per day, Cameroon generates around $20.40 million in pipeline royalties, and Niger's economy gains from oil exploitation in Zinder and Agadem (Mitchell et al., 2012). These have heightened danger factors in the Lake Chad region, potentially exacerbating the Boko Haram insurgency.

Since 2009, Boko Haram's operations have been unprecedented in magnitude and nature, regarded by Western media and many Nigerians as part of a larger worldwide theological battle between Muslims and Christians. This argument has garnered widespread religious concern globally, as each religious sect seeks to uphold its own beliefs. Owing to the persistent actions of the terrorist organisation, Nigeria increasingly resembles the Hobbesian state of nature, characterised by brevity, brutality, and insecurity of life. Consequently, while Boko Haram instills terror in Nigeria, the nation's international standing oscillates between that of a "hybrid state," a "weak state," and nearly a "failed

state." The 2016 Global Terrorism Index designates Nigeria as the second most terrorised country globally, attributable to the relentless onslaught of the Boko Haram terrorist organisation on the nation's political landscape.

The challenge resides in the complex nature of the situation and the varied perspectives, which complicate the analysis of the group's objectives and its evolution from a local sect to a terrorist organisation. This complexity has engendered numerous suspicions on all sides, which have at times escalated into comprehensive conspiracy theories (Dennis, 2019). Consequently, it becomes increasingly challenging to reduce the Boko Haram insurgency to a simple national ethno-religious uprising without acknowledging its regional and international political and economic implications.

Research Questions

i. In what manner has Boko Haram transformed from its inception as a domestic militant entity to its present recognition as an international terrorist organisation?
ii. What are the principal financial networks and funding sources that support the Boko Haram insurgency, including the impact of criminal operations such as arms trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and external financing from state and non-state entities?
iii. What conspiracy theories pertain to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North Eastern States?
iv. What are the diverse effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on North-Eastern Nigeria?

Research Objectives

i. To analyse the historical progression of the Boko Haram insurgency, following its transformation from a domestic militant group to an internationally acknowledged terrorist organisation.
ii. To examine the financial networks and funding sources that support the Boko Haram insurgency, encompassing criminal operations such as arms trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and external financing from both state and non-state entities.
iii. To ascertain the conspiracy theories associated with the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's North Eastern Region.
iv. To examine the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on North-Eastern Nigeria.

Research Methodology

This study utilised a qualitative methodology, leveraging secondary data to investigate the history and origins of the insurgency, its causes, and the associated internal and external factors. The secondary data approach is employed in research to analyse and interpret pre-existing information gathered by others for purposes pertinent to the current study. This method relies on the use of data sourced from diverse materials such as academic publications, governmental reports, media outlets, organisational archives, or historical documents to address research questions or objectives.

Boko Haram: Boko haram is an Islamic Terrorist organisation, having its origin in the North Eastern region of Nigeria, which believes that Western Education is forbidden.

Insurgency: Insurgency is an act of revolt that causes uprising, chaos and conflict, leading to violent destruction of life and property.

International Conspiracy: This is the belief that violent or other kinds of crises do not happen accidentally. They are always orchestrated by a group of parties in their interest.

North-Eastern Region: These are the six states in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria based on the geo-political zoning.

Popper Karl (1945), Conspiracy Theory

To enhance the understanding of this research, the analysis is grounded in Karl Popper's (1945) *Conspiracy Theory*, which interprets conspiracy as a typical feature of political dynamics in classical Athens as depicted by Plato. In his assessment of twentieth-century totalitarian regimes, Popper noted that "I do not wish to imply that conspiracies never happened. On the contrary, they are a typical social phenomenon." This theory posits that significant negative occurrences are deliberately orchestrated by individuals or groups rather than resulting from coincidence or unforeseen outcomes (Wood, 1982). Essentially, conspiracy theory explains that certain phenomena emerge from secret collaborations among interested actors. It is premised on the conviction that hidden yet powerful forces, often politically driven and oppressive in intent, are accountable for puzzling events. The theory therefore suggests a coalition of interests among individuals' intent on shaping outcomes, though their efforts may not always yield success, their sense of fulfilment stems from engaging in such coordinated actions. The generalisations from conspiracy theory are:

- Conspiracy is a tool of nation-state and other political actors
- Events and outcomes are planned and intended in a political system.

- Conspiratory actions have economic incentives and potential.
- Propaganda and secret diplomacy are means of pursuing goals.

A major limitation of this theory lies in its lack of empirical validation and the challenge of identifying the alleged conspirators. Although it has faced extensive scholarly criticism, it remains a logical framework for interpreting political events. When applied to this study, it suggests that the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was not a random occurrence. The pattern of the group's operations points to strong political undertones and the pursuit of certain interests linked to unidentified elites in northern Nigeria. While concrete evidence is limited, public statements made by former governors of Borno, Gombe, and Bauchi States, Ali Modu Sheriff, Mohammed Goje Danjuma, and Mallam Isa Yuguda, have indicated varying degrees of sympathy or alignment with the sect's agenda. Similarly, Nigeria's former Finance Minister, Alhaji Adamu Ciroma, speaking on behalf of the Northern Political Leaders Forum, warned that Jonathan's presidency could trigger grave political consequences beyond immediate control (Source Magazine, July 4, 2011, p. 7). From this perspective, the Boko Haram insurgency can be interpreted as a product of an orchestrated conspiracy, making the conspiracy theory a useful lens for understanding its emergence and dynamics in Nigeria.

Overview of Boko Haram

Boko Haram originated around 2002-2003 as a marginal Sunni prayer group led by Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic Salafist scholar advocating for restrictions on Western education through a literal interpretation of the Quran. Known in Arabic as Jama'a Ahl as-Sunna Li-da'wa wa-al Jihad, meaning "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad," the group is commonly referred to as Boko Haram, which translates to "Western education is forbidden." Its roots can be traced to radical Islamist youth who attended the Al-Haji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri during the 1990s. It is believed that some former members of the Nigerian Taliban, a small yet violent movement active from 2002 to 2004, integrated into Boko Haram (ICG, 2014).

In its formative period, Boko Haram displayed traits of a largely pacific organisation and encountered little interference from governmental authorities. The group established a religious enclave comprising a mosque and an educational facility for impoverished families. Scholars have observed the group's development into a self-sufficient entity, complete with a governing structure, religious law enforcement, and a substantial

agricultural sector for sustenance. Over time, the movement expanded its reach to additional areas, including Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger states (Walker, 2004). Despite a critical perspective towards the administration, Yusuf actively engaged in official initiatives to implement and enforce Sharia law in various northern regions during the early 2000s.

By 2008, Boko Haram adopted a more militant approach, amassing small arms at its bases in Maiduguri and Bauchi. On 11 June 2009, a confrontation with the police escalated into violence. Nigeria had recently enacted a law requiring the use of motorbike helmets; however, during a funeral procession for members who had perished in a car accident, Boko Haram members defied this regulation. The police interpreted this as a provocation from an increasingly aggressive group that needed to be addressed

Following Yusuf's demise, Boko Haram retreated to reorganise. During this interval, it evolved from a proselytising movement into an armed militant organisation aimed at displacing the northern political establishment and ultimately toppling the national government (Pérouse, 2014). In 2010, it resurfaced under new leadership. Abubakar Shekau, the new spiritual leader and operational commander, is significantly more radical than Yusuf. Under his command, Boko Haram adopted the methodologies of international Jihadi terrorist organisations, including targeted assassinations, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, and, more recently, kidnapping and hostage-taking for ransom.

Notable incidents include the assault on a prison in Bauchi in September 2010, resulting in the escape of approximately 700 inmates, including Boko Haram affiliates, and the bombing of the U.N. building in Abuja in August 2011, which resulted in over 20 fatalities and more than 80 injuries. Additionally, Boko Haram abducted over 270 schoolgirls from Chibok in Borno State in April 2014 (Blanchard, 2016; U.S. Congress, 2011). The group remains active in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger, intensifying the

In 2016, Boko Haram bifurcated into two factions, with the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) emerging as a distinct entity under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the progeny of Mohammed Yusuf (International Crisis Group, 2019; Omeni, 2019). Although both Boko Haram and ISWAP employ violence to further their objectives, ISWAP's operational strategies diverge from those of Boko Haram. While Boko Haram persists in targeting innocent civilians, including Muslims, ISWAP predominantly concentrates on military objectives. Consequently, ISWAP's operations have resulted in a higher incidence of military casualties compared to civilian casualties (International Crisis Group, 2019).

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Prof. A.I. Mteiye [MALAWI]

Analysis of Historical Trends in the Boko Haram Insurgency

Violence, mass casualties, and harm perpetrated by terrorists are inherently aimed at achieving a specific objective, which, within a governmental context, can only be interpreted as a political ambition (Akpotor & Oromareghake, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency during the administrations of Yar'adua, Goodluck, and Buhari represents a subsequent phase in the persistent cycle of violence observed in Nigeria. The rising incidence of fatalities, explosions, abductions, and kidnappings predominantly linked to Boko Haram is alarming.



Fig. 1 Nigeria with the conflict and non-conflict states of the North East

In their attempt to implement Sharia rule in specific areas of Nigeria, many individuals have been killed, displaced, or orphaned (Botha et al., 2017). The table below presents several significant instances of the Boko Haram insurgency:

Date	Location	Description of Insurgency	Victim Count
Umar Yar'adua's Regime			
July 26, 2009	Bauchi, Nigeria	Boko Haram militants clashed with security forces, resulting in an unknown number of casualties.	Unknown
November 4, 2009	Maiduguri, Nigeria	Boko Haram attacked police stations, prisons, and government buildings, leading to hundreds of deaths.	Hundreds
December 24, 2009	Jos, Nigeria	Coordinated bombings targeted Christian areas, leading to over 80 fatalities.	Over 80
January 17, 2010	Bauchi, Nigeria	Gunmen attacked a prison, freeing inmates and killing four people.	4
March 7, 2010	Maiduguri, Nigeria	Boko Haram gunmen opened fire on a police station, killing 13 officers.	13
Goodluck Jonathan's Regime			
June 7, 2011	Abuja, Nigeria	A car bombing at the police headquarters in Abuja resulted in 18 deaths.	18
August 26, 2011	Abuja, Nigeria	Boko Haram targeted the UN building in Abuja, killing 23 people.	23
November 4, 2011	Damaturu, Nigeria	Boko Haram militants attacked security forces and government buildings, resulting in 150+ fatalities.	150+
January 20, 2012	Kano, Nigeria	Coordinated bombings and shootings in Kano led to 185 deaths.	185
April 8, 2012	Kaduna, Nigeria	Boko Haram targeted churches in Kaduna, killing 38 people.	38
April 14, 2014	Chibok, Nigeria	Boko Haram abducted 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, sparking international outrage.	276 abducted
May 20, 2014	Gamboru Ngala, Nigeria	Boko Haram militants attacked a market and town, resulting in hundreds of deaths.	310
January 3, 2015	Baga, Nigeria	Boko Haram carried out a massacre in Baga, with hundreds killed.	2000+
February 17, 2015	Potiskum, Nigeria	Gunmen attacked a college in Potiskum, killing 47 students.	47
Muhammad Buhari's Regime			
July 17, 2015	Zaria, Nigeria	Boko Haram targeted a Shia religious procession, resulting in 32 fatalities.	32
2018	Dapchi, Yobe State	Boko Haram abducted 110 schoolgirls from the Government Girls' Science and Technical College. Most were later released, but one girl, Leah Sharibu, remains in captivity.	110 abducted
2019	Rann, Borno State	A Nigerian Air Force airstrike accidentally hit a camp for internally displaced people, resulting in about 100 deaths.	85 killed, 65 injured
2020	Chibok, Borno State	Boko Haram attacked a village, killing seven people and abducting several others.	7 killed, several abducted
2021	Geidam, Yobe State	Boko Haram attacked the town, causing significant destruction and displacement.	37 killed

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Prof. A.I. Mteiye [MALAWI]

During the administrations of Umar Yar'adua and Goodluck Jonathan, Nigeria faced severe insurgent attacks from Boko Haram, resulting in numerous casualties and significant incidents such as the abduction of schoolgirls in Chibok. The assaults targeted security forces, government buildings, and civilian populations, leading to considerable loss of life and creating a pervasive sense of insecurity across the nation. The nature of the insurgency during Jonathan's tenure was marked by relentless brutality, including bombings, shootings, abductions, and massacres, with Boko Haram demonstrating the capacity for large-scale coordinated offensives.

The Effect

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has led to significant loss of life and property, widespread displacement, and the erosion of livelihoods. Approximately 37,500 fatalities have occurred due to the insurgency, with 2.5 million individuals displaced and around 244,000 seeking refuge. Furthermore, an estimated 952,029 children have been forced to abandon their education. This crisis has resulted in the northeast region accounting for 60 percent, or 6.3 million, of Nigeria's 10.5 million out-of-school children (Abiodun et al., 2020; Shola, 2020). The extremist insurgency has the following specific impacts:

Socioeconomic Impact

The activities of Boko Haram have profoundly affected the socioeconomic conditions of individuals in the Northern region. For example, commercial banks have had to revise their operating hours, changing from the standard 8:00 am to 4:00 pm to a new schedule of 9:00 am to noon, as noted by Mohammed (2012). As a result, bank clients, particularly traders, face difficulties in depositing their daily earnings due to the limited operational hours. This has adversely impacted the overall revenue of banks, affecting not only the local economy but also countries involved in trade within the Northern territories. This situation will have implications for the socioeconomic dynamics of the region, influencing not only Nigeria but also neighbouring nations such as Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, among others (Nicholas, 2020).

According to Mohammed (2012), this represents a facet of the measures implemented by financial institutions to safeguard their business premises. The activities of the Boko Haram group threaten the continuity of the NYSC program in the Northern region, which 267ocalized267 national unity. For instance, 4,171 corps members were deployed to provide service in Adamawa state, subsequently receiving training to serve as Adhoc staff for the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) during the 2011 elections. However, 1,041 of them chose to return to their home states prior to the general elections, citing insecurity in the Northern region as the principal reason (Ovaga, 2018). The killings

of corps members by Boko Haram in the northern states have incited vigorous protests from the corps members, who refuse any assignments to crisis-affected states in the north until stability is restored.

Research conducted by Ugwu and Eme (2019) investigated the socio-economic ramifications of insecurity on the general populace and the national economy. Insecurity, manifesting through various forms such as bombings, kidnapping, destruction of life and property, and instilling fear, has evolved into a formidable challenge that security forces in Nigeria seem unable to mitigate. The findings indicated that the issue of insecurity adversely affects the overall well-being of the populace, resulting in diminished quality of life, population displacement, fatalities, destruction of businesses and property, as well as the relocation and closure of enterprises.

Impact on Education

Schools ravaged by Boko Haram's activities are struggling to attract both teachers and students, primarily due to the detrimental impact on classroom infrastructure and facilities. The destruction and impairment of these structures severely limit educational access in areas such as Potiskum, where institutions have been incinerated, leading to the loss of classrooms, essential learning materials, tools, and academic records (Oladujoye and Omemu, 2013). The repercussions of insecurity affect not only students and educators but also educational administration, as damaged schools require repairs to restore functionality.

Furthermore, Oteguwu (2015) contended that the Yobe State Ministry of Education revealed that by June 2014, over 209 schools had been destroyed by insurgent attacks, highlighting the significant impact of the insurgency on the educational sector. The availability of essential infrastructure and educational resources is crucial for enabling access to education, as the physical condition of schools directly affects the morale, effectiveness, and learning environment of educators. Insufficient educational facilities not only threaten the right to education but also hinder the learning process.

The accessibility of primary education in the northeastern states has been significantly compromised by intentional assaults on educational institutions by Boko Haram, leading to the destruction of over 300 schools and the tragic demise of 314 children from 2012 to 2014, according to UNICEF (UNICEF, 2015). These attacks highlight the devastating impact of the insurgency on the educational framework, underscoring the urgent need for measures to protect educational access and quality in the affected regions.

Impact on Infrastructure

The empirical study by Adebisi, Oyedeji, and Azeez (2020) examined the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, focused on defining, addressing, and comprehending its

effects on the telecommunications sector. The research employed a descriptive exploratory design to assess Boko Haram as a domestic terrorist group in Nigeria. The group's activities have incapacitated socio-economic operations and inflicted damage on telecommunications infrastructure in northeastern Nigeria.

Impact on Agriculture

The insurgency that began in Nigeria in 2009 has expanded throughout the northeastern region, affecting states such as Yobe, Adamawa, and Borno. Boko Haram has employed food scarcity as a strategic instrument to establish control over civilian populations and adversaries. By targeting crops and disrupting food supply chains, they aim to weaken the resilience of impacted communities. Additionally, the insurgency has compelled herders and farmers to flee, resulting in loss of life, livelihoods, and the displacement of thousands, thereby increasing dependence on food assistance from international organisations (Mercedes, 2023).

Nigeria is experiencing a resurgence in food insecurity after a decline in agricultural output. Currently, around 13 million people in the country are facing food insecurity issues (Tafida, 2023). The North-Eastern region, a focal point of conflict for over a decade, is particularly vulnerable. The activities of Boko Haram have severely disrupted agricultural operations, forcing farmers to abandon their fields. This disruption has led to reduced crop yields and a general scarcity of food in the area.

Empirical evidence from the study indicated that Adebisi, Azeez, and Oyedeji (2016) investigated the impact of Boko Haram's insurgency on Nigeria's agricultural sector. A time series analysis research method was employed, 269ocalized descriptive statistics and t-tests to analyse secondary data from before and during the insurgency. The findings revealed that the agricultural value added to GDP was substantial prior to the Boko Haram disruption but diminished during the insurgency. Consequently, the study recommends that the government undertake legal and equitable measures to mitigate the adverse effects of Boko Haram on the agricultural sector and provide enhanced incentives to encourage farmers to resume their activities.

Table1. Agricultural Output (tones) on a yearly basis in Nigeria

10 years before the insurgency	Agricultural Output to Nigeria GDP	10 years during the insurgency	Agricultural output to Nigeria GDP
1994	38.8108824	2004	**34.21028658**
1995	32.06099353	2005	**32.75542177**
1996	31.13372236	2006	**31.9987955**
1997	34.03135991	2007	**32.71417898**

10 years before the insurgency	Agricultural Output to Nigeria GDP	10 years during the insurgency	Agricultural output to Nigeria GDP
1998	39.0478495	2008	**32.85021918**
1999	35.30644453	2009	**37.05016484**
2000	26.0339777	2010	**23.89370408**
2001	33.7537884	2011	**22.28919858**
2002	48.56594018	2012	**22.05428761**
2003	**42.70726998**	**2013**	**20.99639753**

Source: World Bank, (2016)

Arms Smuggling by Boko Haram across Permeable Borders

A critical concern involves the escalating deployment of sophisticated weaponry by Boko Haram militants in recent assaults, as evidenced by the arms confiscations executed by security forces in northern Nigeria. This discourse illuminates the group's unlawful arms trafficking operations within Nigeria and its neighbouring regions, potentially signifying a wider trend of arms proliferation among terrorist organisations in Africa. Permeable borders remain the principal source and conduit for small arms and light weapons (SALWs) throughout the African continent, particularly in Nigeria (Musa, 2013).

The Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria, especially In the northeast, has been intensified by the permeability of Nigeria's borders with Cameroon (1,690 kilometres) to the east, Niger (1,497 kilometres) to the north, Benin (773 kilometres) to the west, and Chad (87 kilometres) to the northeast. Numerous border regions are challenged by difficult terrains, including mountains and dense vegetation. Despite their diverse geographical features, the porous nature of the country's borders is a consistent factor (Okunmu, 2010).

Musa (2013) disclosed that Boko Haram's operational methodology in arms smuggling encompasses both transnational and domestic trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). The group exploits Nigeria's porous borders to transport arms using diverse techniques, including concealing SALWs within bags of grains, cartons of merchandise, or makeshift compartments in vehicles to avoid detection. Additionally, the group conceals arms in special tanks within vehicles, fuel tankers, or sewage tankers for extensive transfers.

International Collaborators of Boko Haram: State and Non-State Collaborators

The Boko Haram insurgency began as a regional movement in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe States in northeast Nigeria; however, since August 2011, there has been an increasing trend of cross-border collaboration between Boko Haram and militant organisations outside Nigeria. This partnership has expanded to include the border region of Borno

State, northern Mali, the Sahel region, Somalia, and several other countries within the Islamic world (Jacob, 2013).



Fig. 3 BHT Relationship with International Organizations

Source: BAAD, 2013

As a result of these transnational connections, Boko Haram, once regarded as a group defined by rudimentary weaponry and tactics in 2009, has now attained an operational capacity that rivals, and in some instances exceeds, certain factions associated with al-Qa`ida (Jemal, 2012). Additionally, al-Qa`ida's ideological tenets have been amalgamated with the initial local motivations propelling the insurgency in northern Nigeria.

Findings / Contribution to Knowledge

1. **The international community has been actively involved in Boko Haram activities in the northeastern region of Nigeria.**
   Given the established cultural, religious, and ethnic ties between north-eastern Nigeria and the populations surrounding Lake Chad, the Boko Haram insurgency

rapidly expanded into neighbouring states within the Lake Chad Basin. Boko Haram's connections with militant groups in northern Mali, the Sahel region, and other areas of the Muslim world enable the exchange of support with various Islamist militias. As a result, Boko Haram can maintain its operations beyond its primary base in Borno State, even if key leaders like Abubakar Shekau are removed by Nigerian security forces.

2. **Conspiracies surrounding the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeastern region of Nigeria**.

   The research indicated via historical data that the inception of the Boko Haram insurgency is perceived as politically motivated, reflecting the interests of an unidentified faction in northern Nigeria. Former governors and political figures from the region have been associated with supporting or sympathising with the Boko Haram sect, suggesting a potential link to the insurgency's origins. Another hypothesis posits that Boko Haram is orchestrated by discontented northern Muslim politicians seeking to impose difficulties on a southern Christian president.

3. **The Boko Haram conflict has imposed significant socioeconomic distress in northeastern Nigeria.**

   The Boko Haram insurgency has inflicted numerous socio-economic, infrastructural, agricultural, and educational repercussions on the populace of north-east Nigeria. This conflict has resulted in significant loss of life and property, alongside widespread displacement. Approximately 37,500 fatalities have occurred, with 2.5 million individuals displaced and 244,000 seeking refuge. Furthermore, around 952,029 children have ceased their education, leading to 1.5 million fleeing their homes for safety. The northeast region accounts for 60% (6.3 million) of Nigeria's total 10.5 million out-of-school children as a consequence of this crisis.

Conclusion

The study concluded that the Boko Haram insurgency in northeastern Nigeria has expanded into neighbouring countries within the Lake Chad Basin, aided by pre-existing cultural and religious connections and affiliations with militant groups in other areas. The insurgency's origins are thought to be politically driven, potentially linked to prominent figures in northern Nigeria. The socio-economic repercussions of the insurgency have been catastrophic, leading to substantial loss of life, displacement, and disruption of

education and livelihoods. Tackling the underlying causes of the insurgency and its extensive consequences poses a significant challenge for Nigeria and the international community.

Recommendations

1. Fortify our border with an adequately financed joint task force.

The Federal Government must fortify our borders with adjacent nations and create a robust collaboration to establish a well-resourced Joint Taskforce. Additionally, there is a necessity for enhanced dialogue with the other riparian states of the Lake Chad Basin, focusing on the cessation of arms smuggling across their territories to the Nigerian border.

2. Identify politicians purportedly involved.

The Federal Government should, through due diligence, identify the major politicians reportedly engaged in the formation and funding of the Boko Haram cult and administer commensurate penalties.

3.The government must diligently strive to eradicate the insurgency.

The federal and relevant state governments must collaborate diligently to eradicate the Boko Haram insurgency, as it is their fundamental obligation to ensure the security and welfare of the populace.

References

Adela, A. (2021). Boko Haram: The Group of the People of the Sunna for Preaching and Jihad. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 18(4):272–284

Adela, G. (2021). Institutional Counterinsurgency Frameworks in Africa's Lake Chad Basin and the Operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force Against Boko Haram.

Adesoji, A. O. (2020). Boko Haram insurgency and the challenges of national security in Nigeria. *Journal of African Religions 17(3)*: 194-208.

Agbiboa, D. E. (2015). Boko Haram: The socio-economic drivers. African Security Review, 24(4), 362-376.

BAAD. (2013). BHT Relationship with International Organizations*Global Journal of Human Social Sciences*, 13(7), 45-57.

Babayo, D. (2021). *Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian-Cameroon Relations (2009--2019)* (Doctoral dissertation, Kwara State University (Nigeria)).

Babayo, S. (2021). *Boko Haram's Violence in Northern Nigeria*. Population and Development Review 12(3):587–612

Blanchard, L. P. (2016). *Nigeria's 2015 Elections and the Boko Haram Crisis.* USA: Congressional Research Service, March 8.

Comolli, V. (2015). *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist Insurgency*. London: Hurst & Company.

Comolli, V. (2015). *Boko Haram: Nigeria's Islamist insurgency*. Oxford University Press.

Dennis, P. (2019). *Boko Haram*: *The history of an African jihadist movement.* Princeton University Press.

ICG. (2012). *Curbing violence in Nigeria: The Jos crisis.* Brussels: International Crisis Group.

International Crisis Group. (2019). "Fighting Boko Haram in Chad: Beyond military measures." *Africa Report N°246, 8 March*.

Jacob, J. (2013). Cross-border cooperation and regional militant networks: The case of Boko Haram. *Journal of African Security Studies*, 22(1), 45-58.

Jemal, A. (2012). The evolution of Boko Haram's operational capacity and affiliations with al-Qa`ida. *Journal of Terrorism Research*, *8*(3), 112-125.

Mercedes, S. (2023). The strategic use of food scarcity by Boko Haram in Nigeria. International Journal of Political Strategy, 29(4), pp. 112-130.

Mitchell, J., Marcel, V., & Mitchell, B. (2012). What Next for the Oil and Gas Industry? London, UK: Chatham House.

Muhammad, A. (2014). "The effect of Boko Haram crises on socio-economic activities in Yobe State." *The Journal of Social Sciences in Humanities Invention, 1*(4).

Murphy, R. (2017, August 18). What if oil is the true ideology of Boko Haram? Retrieved from https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/08/18/what-if-oil-is-the-true-ideology-of-boko-haram/

Musa, F. C. (2013). Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. Retrieved from Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.

Musa, S. (2013), 'Border Security, Arms Proliferation and Terrorism in Nigeria,' *Sahara Reporters*, 20 April, http://saharareporters.com/article/border-security-arms-proliferation-and-terrorism-nigeria-lt-col-sagir-musa?goback=.gde_4451300_member_234179302 .

Okumu, W. (2010), 'Africa's Problematic Borderlines,' *Africa.org*, February/March, p.22.

Okunmu, F. (2010). Porous Borders and Armed Proliferation: Nigeria's Endless Security Dilemma. RSIS International. Retrieved from RSIS International.

Oladujoye, P., & Omemu, F. (2013). The impact of Boko Haram insurgency on educational infrastructure. *Journal of African Interdisciplinary Studies*, 2(2), 80-89

Oladunjoye. P & Omemu, F. (2013).''Effect of Boko Haram on school Attendance in Northern Nigeria'', *European centre for research, Training and Development* UK. 1 (2), 9-22.

Oladunjoye. P & Omemu, F. (2014).''Effect of Boko Haram on school Attendance in Northern Nigeria'', *British Journal of Education* Vol. 1, No.2. pp. 1-9

Omenma, J. T. (2019). Untold Story of Boko Haram Insurgency: The Lake Chad Oil and Gas Connection. *Politics and Religion, 2019*. DOI: 10.1017/S1755048319000166.

Oteguwu, S. (2015). The effects of insurgency on educational development in Yobe State. *International Journal of Innovative Education Research*, 7(4), 75-84

Otegwu, I. (2015). Insurgency in West Africa: A critical assessment of Federal government response to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria (2009-2013). Ph.D. thesis submitted to the post graduate school, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria.

Pérouse de Montclos, M.-A. (2014). "A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram." *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27*(5), 878–895.

Popper, K. (1945) *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Plc.

Popper, K. (1945). *The conspiracy theory of society*. In *The open society and its enemies* (Vol.)

Popper, K. (2006). "*The Conspiracy Theory of Society." In: Conspiracy Theories: The Philosophical Debate. Coady, David, ed*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Co

Sani, A. (2021). *The North Eastern Region of Nigeria: Socio-economic challenges and poverty rates*.

Sani, M. (2021). Exploring the role of ECOWAS's conflict prevention framework in the light of a terrorist insurgency: The case of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Tafida, A. (2023). Resurgence of food insecurity in Nigeria. African Journal of Food Policy, 15(2), pp. 45-67.

Tafida, A., Tukur, A. Adebayo, E., Ndaghu, A., Onu, J., & Momodu, (2023). Boko Haram insurgency and livelihood vulnerability of rural households in Northern Adamawa State, Nigeria. *Research in Globalization*, 6, 100116.

Tafida, M. U., Bello, A. A., & Musa, A. A. (2023). *Consequences of socio-economic challenges in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states*. *Journal of Regional Development*, 17(2), 123-140

Thurston, A. (2018). *Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ugwu, C., & Eme, O. I. (2019). The socio-economic cost of insecurity in Nigeria. *The European Journal of Development Research*, 35(4), 743-769

Walker, A. (2012). *What is Boko Haram?* Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Wood, J. (1982). *Conspiracy theories: A critical introduction*. Polity Press.