SECURITY AS A DILEMMA TO DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the intricate relationship between security challenges and democracy in Nigeria. It aims to shed light on the implications of security dilemmas for democratic processes, how law and order have been maintained by the security forces while upholding democratic principles, and the influence of civil society organizations in promoting democracy and security. A survey design method was employed to gather data from 40 respondents representing various segments of Nigerian society. The findings reveal a diverse range of perspectives on these critical issues. While some respondents believe that security challenges can stimulate democratic resilience, others see them as hindrances to democratic development. The role of security forces in balancing security and democracy remains polarized, with some perceiving a prioritization of democratic values and others disagreeing. Civil society organizations also evoke mixed perceptions, with some considering them positive agents of change and others expressing concerns. To navigate these

complexities effectively, policymakers must recognize and address diverse perspectives, strengthen democratic institutions, deepen democratic principles, reform the security policy, enforce anti-corruption measures, and implement electoral reforms. These recommendations are crucial for fostering a secure and democratic Nigeria.

Introduction

Study background

Security and democracy are two fundamental pillars that underpin the stability and development of any nation. In Nigeria, a country characterized by its diversity in culture, religion, and ethnicity, the delicate balance between security and democracy has been a subject of growing concern. People are at the heart of democracy. It is also about quality leadership, constitutions and constitutionality, the rule of law, political discipline, fostering democratic values, establishing strong and viable political institutions, and assuring the common man that there is a collective future of work. Democracy is also about human rights, particularly socioeconomic and cultural rights, due process, accountability, fiscal discipline, transparency, and the careful but targeted allocation of limited resources to meet most people's basic needs. Democracy also entails ensuring continuous and qualitative improvement in people's lives, in their socioeconomic, political, cultural, and spiritual development, as well as protecting their environment, decolonizing their minds, and putting people at the centre of holistic and sustainable growth and development.

Security administration on the other hand necessarily places a premium on national interests and values. The linkage is inevitable. Security administration arises from the need to protect the integrity of the state and the interests that make this integrity meaningful. It is therefore a measurement of national interests as it emerges from these interests, functions to serve them and is ultimately directed at their attainment. The defence of

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these interests itself defines security administration. Similarly, a nation's interest is predicated upon values and can only be perceived as having been defended when values are safe. The most important measure of the state and the highest priority of its government is security. It encompasses the defence and preservation of its territorial integrity in the face of external aggression and internal disruption. It is the foundation upon which governance's viability is built. However, since the advent of democratic governance in Nigeria, there has been a remarkable deterioration in this most important aspect. An intermittent extremist religious insurgency has erupted into a full-fledged war, resulting in not only the loss of hundreds of innocent lives but also the deployment of our military to retake territory from the violent Islamic sect known as Boko Haram.

In Nigeria, as in other societies, there is evidence of a link between democratic governance and the country's security. Domestic security in Nigeria has deteriorated significantly since 1999 (Mijah, 2006). Nigeria is a country divided into overlapping regional, religious, and ethnic groups. Rifts between the country's north and south, ethnic groups, Islam, and Christianity frequently overlap, resulting in sectarian violence. For example, the retaliatory bloodshed between farmers and herdsmen occurs regularly in the   former Middle Belt. For more than a decade, an insurgency against the Abuja government has raged in the Niger Delta over regional, ethnic, and environmental grievances. Since 1999, credible observers have attributed over a thousand deaths in Nigeria to ethnic, religious, and regional conflicts. Nigeria has reportedly witnessed over 90 ethno-religious, communal, political, and electoral conflicts of varying intensity and scale since the return to civilian rule in 1999 (Elaigwu: 2005; pp. 57-76).

Added to this, or as a result, is a palpable sense of growing insecurity (in a broad sense), largely caused by rising crime rates and the increasing restriction of space for effective public participation. This assumption generated a wide range of reactions from the populace as well as the Nigerian state (Mohammed: 2005). On both sides, some actions further undermined the foundations of internal security.

Statement of the Problem

Nigeria, a nation celebrated for its cultural diversity, abundant natural resources, and historical significance, has in recent years grappled with an array of complex security challenges. These challenges, which range from the persistent Boko Haram insurgency to ethno-religious conflicts and the escalating farmer-herder clashes, have not only threatened the lives and livelihoods of its citizens but also cast a shadow of doubt over the stability and future of its democratic institutions. Nigeria's democracy, though relatively young, holds great promise as a model for democratic governance on the African continent. However, the pressing concern lies in the extent to which these burgeoning security dilemmas have corroded the foundations of democracy in the nation. The multifaceted nature of security issues in Nigeria is deeply intertwined with the complex fabric of its society. Boko Haram, for instance, has relentlessly targeted schools, communities, and government institutions, leaving a trail of destruction and trauma in its wake.

Likewise, the escalation of farmer-herder conflicts has resulted in the displacement of thousands, exacerbating communal tensions and undermining the trust in the government's ability to safeguard its citizens. Consequently, it is essential to address the central problem that this thesis seeks to unravel: how have these security dilemmas, rooted in various sociopolitical, economic, and historical factors, impacted the democratic processes in Nigeria?

The dilemma between security and democracy is a topic of global significance, but it takes on a unique and pressing character in Nigeria's context. To address this challenge effectively, it is imperative to recognize that the security-democracy nexus is not a one-dimensional problem. Rather, it is a multifaceted dilemma involving issues of governance, human rights, civil liberties, and state legitimacy. The intricate interplay between these elements has created a complex web of challenges that require careful analysis and thoughtful policy responses. This research endeavours to dissect the intricacies of this dilemma, shedding light on the dynamics that shape Nigeria's security and democracy landscape. As Nigeria continues to grapple with these security challenges, there is an urgent need to examine the implications of these issues for its democratic system. By studying the multifaceted relationship between security and democracy in Nigeria, this research aims to

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contribute to a better understanding of the challenges confronting not only Nigeria but also other countries balancing national security and democratic values.

In doing so, this thesis aspires to offer valuable insights into how Nigeria can address its security dilemmas without compromising the principles of democracy and human rights that underpin its democratic aspirations.

Research objectives

The following are the research objectives:

1. To investigate Nigeria's security challenges and their implications for democratic processes.
2. To evaluate the role of security forces in upholding law and order while adhering to democratic principles.
3. Assess the role of civil society organisations in promoting democracy and security.

Research questions

The study aims to provide answers to the following research questions:

i. How do security challenges like the Boko Haram insurgency and ethno-religious conflicts affect Nigeria's democratic processes?
ii. What role do security forces play in addressing security challenges while upholding democratic values?
iii. To what extent do civil society organisations contribute to resolving security issues and promoting democracy?

Significance of the Study

The significance of this research is multifaceted and encompasses both academic and practical dimensions.

Academic Significance

At the academic level, this study contributes to the existing body of knowledge in several ways:

By delving into the intricate relationship between security and democracy in Nigeria, this research adds depth to theoretical discussions in political science, international relations, and security studies. It provides a nuanced understanding of how security challenges in a diverse and complex nation like Nigeria can influence democratic processes. Nigeria serves as an empirical case study that has implications beyond its borders. Understanding the dynamics of the security-democracy dilemma in Nigeria can shed light on similar challenges faced by other nations in Africa and around the world, particularly those with diverse populations and histories of conflict. This research bridges the gap between political science, security studies, and development studies, drawing from multiple disciplines to offer a comprehensive analysis of the issues at hand. It encourages interdisciplinary dialogue and collaboration.

Practical Significance

Practically, this study has several important implications:

As Nigeria grapples with ongoing security challenges, this research can provide policymakers and government officials with insights into the complex interplay between security and democracy. It offers recommendations for policy adjustments that balance security imperatives with the preservation of democratic values. By dissecting the root causes of security challenges and their impact on democracy, this research can inform conflict resolution strategies not only in Nigeria but also in other conflict-prone regions. Lessons learned from Nigeria can guide international organizations, NGOs, and governments in their efforts to promote peace and stability. Nigeria's role in Africa and the world stage makes its security-democracy dilemma of global significance. This study contributes to international relations discussions by examining how external actors, including neighbouring countries and international organizations, influence Nigeria's security and democracy dynamics.

Civil society organizations play a critical role in advocating for democratic principles and addressing security challenges. This research can empower civil society actors with a deeper understanding of their potential

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impact on both democracy and security. This research can serve as a resource for educators and students interested in Nigerian politics, African studies, and security studies. It can help inform curricula and encourage critical thinking about the complexities of governance in diverse societies.

Scope and Limitations

This research focuses primarily on Nigeria and its contemporary security challenges within the context of its democratic system. While Nigeria's diversity and complexity provide a rich case study, the findings may not be directly applicable to other nations with different socio-political contexts. Additionally, limitations may include data availability, access to certain regions, and potential bias in source materials.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL REVIEW
CONCEPTUAL REVIEW
Challenges of Security Administration in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the failure of sustainable democratic governance and insecurity may be unrelated to the nature, form, character, and direction of the Nigerian state and its ethno-political system. These, however, indicate a pattern of struggle for political power or democracy in the absence of proper support, which invariably results in violence and the problem of democratic politics and practise in Nigeria (Abbas, 2008). In Nigeria, democratic governance has largely failed to implement sufficient policies and programmes to address the structural imbalances and injustices rooted in colonialism and long periods of authoritarian military rule (Ibrahim: 2002; 197). These structures are divisive and unfit for democracy. They are, however, the very foundation of Nigeria's democratic project. Because of Nigeria's multi-ethnic makeup and the failure of the nationalist project to create a true nation and corresponding national identity (ibid.), ethnic, religious, and other primordial reference points have grown in importance.

Because of the eventual transformation of identities along primordial lines and the entrenchment of negative identity politics, ethnic and religious identities have become the basis for inclusion or exclusion in resource distribution (Sanda, 2003). It is important to note that, as part of a larger victimisation of insecurity in the country, identity transformation and the entrenchment of negative identity politics in Nigeria have gained the upper hand in crises and adaptation in Nigeria (Angerbrandt, 2011). Nigeria's political problems under democratic rule have been exacerbated in many ways by a slew of seemingly intractable economic, managerial, and developmental stressors. This is highlighted by the bloody and divisive sectarian violence that has erupted in several states involving various religious, ethnic, and communal groups. While ethnic and religious differences have always been divisive, the recent epidemic of highly violent communal and religious clashes has become as dangerous as it is upsetting.

Indeed, the establishment of democracy acted as a release valve, allowing people to vent their pent-up rage and express themselves more freely. Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, as Metumara Duruji noted, "opened up a space for the expression of repressed ethno-religious demands constrained by years of oppressive military rule" (Duruji, 2010). This fueled major resistance movements in Nigeria, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the reawakening of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), never-ending ethnic clashes in the Middle Belt region, constant religious clashes and unrest caused by the implementation of Sharia law in the North, the rise of the infamous Odudua People's Congress (OPC) in the west, as well as the radical Islamist sect Boko Haram from northeastern Nigeria.

The situation is exacerbated by a weak institutional mechanism bolstered by the Nigerian state's perverse federal structure inherited from military rule, which impedes efforts to resolve problems amicably, predictably, and holistically (ibid.). In the words of Ake, "Most often the post-colonial state in Nigeria presented itself as an apparatus of violence, and although its base in social forces remained extremely narrow, it relied disproportionately on coercion to comply rather than authority" (Ake, 1992, p. 1). The often-repressive approach of the Nigerian state has fuelled rather than alleviated domestic conflict and violent militancy. The Nigerian state's trigger-happy administrative style - a lasting legacy of protracted military rule

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- is on display in the Niger Delta oil conflict, where national security forces were ordered to destroy protesting oil communities, a clear violation of the rule of law and due process (Duruji, 2010).

The state of relative insecurity in Nigeria must also be understood in the context of the programme of neoliberal reforms, particularly economic reforms, implemented during the country's democratic government. In large part, in the context of structural imbalances and disparities in resource distribution among regions, ethnic nationalities, and individuals, an economic liberalisation programme was established, the implementation of which was accelerated beginning in 1999. Despite its modest gains, particularly in telecommunications and financial sector consolidation (Soludo: 2006; 49), Nigeria's economic reform agenda is exclusionary and de-participatory. The structural imbalance and manipulation of such identities can be blamed for various ethno-religious and even communal conflicts in Nigeria, particularly in the more diverse northern part of the country (Mijah; 2006, 379-380).

The capacity failure of democratic governance, as well as the growing insecurity it engenders, has given rise to violent forms of retaliation that endanger internal security and the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. This convergence is most visible in the major looming internal security threats posed by the situation in Nigeria's oil-rich Niger Delta region. Even though oil resources from this region account for an average of 79.52% of total revenue accruing to the federation from 2000 to 2004 (UNDP: 72), the Niger Delta is perhaps Nigeria's most insecure region. Watt (2004) stated in an analysis of the area's prevailing poverty, destitution, and insecurity, "...compared to the potential for economic growth and sustainable development, the deteriorating economic and social conditions that have been ignored by current policies and actions."

The volatility of the Niger Delta, caused by feelings of injustice and unfairness in the distribution of national resources, disrupted oil activities, causing Nigeria to lose 721,000 barrels of oil per day, or approximately 28.84% of Nigeria's daily OPEC (Guardian, 24 February 2006). They have become a feature of the Niger Delta in their bid to extract concessions from the state and exert local and international pressure on the Nigerian state, take hostages of oil workers abroad, initiate firefights between armed militant groups and state security agencies, and so on, all of which pose a credible threat to Nigeria's internal security in many dimensions. Those claiming to be remnants of Niger Delta militants seeking to benefit from the federal government's amnesty programme continue to pose a threat. They want to be included in the third phase of the amnesty programme. They have repeatedly disrupted the peace and tranquillity in Abuja and other Niger Delta cities (Leadership, February 1, 2013).

Ethno-religious strife and security crises

Nigeria appears to have been racked by ethno-religious and political conflicts since its independence. In Nigeria, ethnic and religious affiliations determine who gets what rather than democratic values; it is so central that it appears to perpetuate discrimination. Many ethno-religious conflicts were exacerbated by the return to civilian rule in 1999. According to Igbinovia, (2019), democracy has increased a culture of impunity for some people, while political differences are thought to have fueled some of the violence. With over 400 ethnic groups belonging to various religious sects, Nigeria has remained a multi-ethnic nation-state struggling to deal with the problem of ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts since independence (Nwankwo, 2015). Politics in Nigeria has been ethnically and regionally based due to the coincidence of regional boundaries with ethnic group boundaries and the overlap of religion and ethnicity. The major political parties tended to represent a specific region or ethnic grouping.

The National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), for example, began as a nationalist movement but evolved into an Eastern and Igbo party mechanism, whereas the Action Group (AG) was Western and Yoruba in orientation. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), which began as a cultural organisation, evolved into an ethnically based party serving the Northern Hausa/Fulani elites' interests. These parties' representatives were uninterested in promoting national integration. Ethnicity determined the constituency most readily available to support the ambitious Nigerian politician's claim to high office. Despite efforts to encourage the formation of national political parties, the parties of the Second Republic (1979-1983) largely adhered to ethnic and regional lines. Although these parties were more diverse than those of the First Republic (1963-1966), they

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were strikingly similar in some ways. The United Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People's Party (NPP), and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) were three of the major political parties contesting the 1979 elections. The UPN was essentially a reincarnation of the AG, with its strongest organisations in the states of the former Western Region. The NPP emerged as a new manifestation of the NCNC, strongest in the Igbo-dominated states of the east. Many saw the NPN, led by northern elites, as the NPC's successor (Omo-Bare et al,2009).). Nigeria has experienced a perceptible intensification of religious polarisation in the last decades of its nationhood, manifesting itself in political mobilisation, sectarian social movements, and increasing violence (Fatai,2016).). This has also resulted in constant ethnic clashes in many parts of the country, such as the Ijaw-itshekiri ethnic clashes in 2009, attacks on Igbos in Kano over the last decade, and retaliatory attacks on northerners (Hausa) in Enugu and other parts of the Igbo-dominated Eastern Nigeria, on the other hand, various ethnic/religious conflicts in Kaduna State, Kafanchan 1987, Zangon Kata In the north of Nigeria, there have also been frequent inter-religious clashes and Sharia-fueled riots, as well as the emergence of Boko Haram Islamic Jihadists with known religious beliefs and social practices (Ogbonnaya et al, 2013).

Intra-ethnic divisions were also prevalent, as evidenced by the horrors of the Ife/Modakeke and Aguleri/Umuleri internecine wars in the South-West and South-East regions. These inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic rivalries, as well as religious crises, not only result in incalculable losses of human and material resources, causing untold economic hardship but also breed a state of anarchy that threatens the unity and existence of society. According to the most recent count, the Boko Haram insurgency in the north has killed over 16,000 police, soldiers, and civilians, including politicians (UNCIRF, 2012; Nigerian Crime News, 31 March 2012). According to Ewetan, et'al (2014), communal and social conflicts arose as a result of new and particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity, which were often structured around ethno-religious identities. As a result, Boko Haram appears to be a destructive political tool disguised as a religious organisation.

This claim is supported by the bombings of the Nigerian Police Force headquarters in Abuja on 16 June 2011, the United Nations House in Abuja on 26 August 2011, and other high-profile bombings. Between July 27, 2009, and February 17, 2012, Boko Haram carried out 53 attacks in northern Nigeria, killing 1,157 people and injuring hundreds more (adapted from Igbinovia, 2019). This indiscriminate and sporadic bombing appears to be making northern Nigeria increasingly dangerous, forcing the majority of the region's non-indigenous people to flee.

Terrorist acts

Terrorism or terrorist-related activities are perhaps the most serious and prevalent security challenge in Nigeria today. Jarna'atu Ahlis Sunna Ladda'awatih Wal-Jihad, also known as Boko-Haram, is a religious Islamic fundamentalist group that is the forerunner of terrorism in Nigeria today. The sect, which is mostly concentrated in the country's northeast, has an ideology that opposes Western education and everything it stands for. The sect also seeks to establish Islamic rule (Sharia) in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram supporters use armed attacks, suicide bombings, and IEDs to target government institutions such as the police and military. However, Nigerian democracy has struggled in recent years to suppress the militant religiosity of the Boko Haram sect. The group's overarching goal is to rid the country of corrupt leaders and establish Sharia as the supreme law of the land. Since its inception in July 2009, the group has killed more people in Nigeria than all other groups combined (Forest, 2012).

These attacks, which are becoming more sophisticated and geographically widespread, target Nigeria's religious and ethnic fault lines to undermine the country's stability. Indeed, the wave of church attacks from December 2011 to July 2012 indicates a "provocation strategy" by which the group seeks to "trigger a large-scale sectarian conflict that destabilises the country" (ibid.). The ideology of Boko Haram, which is rooted in a long tradition of Islamism, is just one of several variants of radical Islamism that have emerged in northern Nigeria. Its followers are said to be influenced by the following scriptural phrase: "Whoever does not follow what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Thurston, 2011). Boko Haram is vehemently opposed to what it sees as a Western invasion undermining and disrupting traditional Muslim values, beliefs, and customs

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in northern Nigeria. According to Mohammed Yusuf, the group's founder, "Western-style education is mixed with issues that go against our beliefs in Islam" (BBC News, 31 July 2009). "Our country was an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it into a Kafir [infidel] country," the charismatic leader declared elsewhere. "The current system is incompatible with true Islamic beliefs," writes the Daily Trust on July 27.

On June 11, the security agency and Boko Haram funeral procession participants clashed over the refusal of mourners to wear motorcycle helmets in Maiduguri. Members of an anti-robbery task force made up of military and police officers opened fire on the procession, killing 17 Boko Haram members (Roelofs, 2014). Mohammed Yusuf demanded justice, but "authorities have neither investigated the alleged use of excessive force nor apologised for the shooting" (Human Rights Watch, 2012). On July 21, state security forces raided the group's hideout in Bauchi, seizing explosives-making materials (Agbiboa, 2013). Following this intervention, the group organised its members to launch retaliatory attacks. On July 26, members of Boko Haram set fire to a police station in Dutsen Tanshi, a Bauchi suburb, killing five Boko Haram members and injuring several police officers (Forest, 2012). In response, the military and police raided a mosque and a house where Boko Haram members had regrouped in Bauchi, killing dozens of the group's members. According to police, 52 Boko Haram members, two police officers, and one soldier were killed in the Bauchi violence (Agbiboa, 2013).

Yusuf vowed vengeance and stated that he was willing to fight to the death in retaliation for the assassination of his followers (Agbiboa, 2013). True to his word, he and his followers launched coordinated attacks on police stations and the homes of police officers (including retired officers) across Maiduguri that night. They set fire to churches and raided the main prison, freeing prisoners and killing guards (ibid.). In response, the Nigerian military shelled Yusuf's compound on July 28 and 29, and many of his followers were arrested, with at least a dozen killed in police custody (Human Rights Watch, 2012). State security forces also raided the group's hideout on the outskirts of Postiskum on July 29, killing at least 43 of Yusuf's followers (Serrano, 2014). On July 30, Nigerian forces apprehended and later killed Mohammed Yusuf, who they claimed was hiding in his father-in-law's goat pen (The Guardian, 4 February 2016). After Yusuf's death and the arrest of several of his followers, the group went dark for a brief period.

For many Boko Haram members, the extrajudicial killing of their founder was a catalyst event that fuelled pre-existing hostility towards state security forces. In a video released in June 2010, Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau, announced that he had taken over the group's leadership and vowed to avenge the deaths of its members (Agbiboa, 2013). A Boko Haram member told the BBC's Hausa radio service in September 2010 that "we are on a revenge mission because most of our members have been killed by the police" (Onuoha, 2012). During the trial of six Boko Haram suspects in November 2011, one of the group's members told the court that their mission was to avenge Yusuf's death (Agbiboa, 2014). Boko Haram continued its retaliatory mission by attacking the Police Headquarters and the United Nations Headquarters (Abuja) in apparent suicide attacks using a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device in June and August 2011, representing a significant leap in the group's technological development. Notably, since the resumption of Boko Haram attacks in 2010, the group has raised more than 60 police stations in at least ten northern and central states, as well as Abuja, killing at least 211 officers (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

At least 119 police officers were killed in suspected Boko Haram attacks between January and September 2012, more than in all of 2010 and 2011 combined (ibid). According to Boko Haram leaders, the attacks are in response to the police's extrajudicial killings of Mohammed Yusuf and other Boko Haram members, as well as other police abuses such as "arbitrary arrests," "torture," and "persecution" of its members (Idris, 2012). Shekau stated in a video message posted online in January 2012, "Everyone saw what the security personnel did to us." "Everyone understood why we were fighting them," writes Sahara Reporters on January 12, 2012. Following a series of Boko Haram bombings in northern Nigeria, President Jonathan declared a State of Emergency (SoE) on December 3, 2011, suspending constitutional guarantees in 15 areas spread across four northern states. The SoE has failed miserably in its efforts to stem the tide of violent attacks in the troubled region.

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The April 2012 order also does not grant security forces extraordinary powers to combat the Boko Haram threat. The SoE carried out more violent attacks and killed more people in six months than in the entire years of 2010 and 2011. (Human Rights Watch, 2012). The violent attacks have nothing to do with Boko Haram's demands, which include the implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria, the immediate release of all its detainees, and the prosecution of those responsible for their leader's death. A day after Boko Haram bombed a church in Madalla, Niger State, the group's spokesman, Abu Qaqaa, declared that "there will never be peace until our demands are met" (Agbiboa, 2013). While Boko Haram's primary goal is to rid Nigeria of its hopelessly corrupt and apostate government and establish Sharia as the supreme law of the land, the group's members are empowered by a cocktail of corruption, poverty, inequality, and unemployment in northern Nigeria (Agbiboa, 2013)

Isa claims that Boko Haram neighbourhoods have been plagued by "poverty, deteriorating social services and infrastructure, lagging in education, increasing numbers of unemployed graduates, huge numbers of unemployed youth, shrinking agricultural assets... and a weak and shrinking productive base of the northern economy" (Agbiboa, 2015). Boko Haram is a symptom of what happens when "the architecture of the state is burdened and destroyed by corruption" (Agbiboa, 2013). The Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram has been brutal and counterproductive, with government security forces being used to "aggressively pursue and suppress [Boko Haram] members" (Onuoha, 2012). To that end, the Nigerian government established a special Joint Military Task Force (JTF) known as "Operation Restore Order" (or JTORO) to combat the Islamist group's threat. The JTF, on the other hand, has been accused of terrorising northern communities and indiscriminately killing innocent people in the name of combating terrorism (Human Rights Watch, 2012). JTFs, for example, were responsible for extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, and "intimidation of harmless Borno residents" in Borno State (Ahmadu et al, 2012).

Far from conducting intelligence-led operations, the JTF, according to Solomon, simply "cordoned off areas and conducted house searches, occasionally shooting young men in these houses" (ibid.). According to a recent Human Rights Watch study on northern Nigeria, during community raids, often following Boko Haram attacks, members of the security forces executed men in front of their families; community members were arbitrarily arrested or beaten; houses, shops, and cars were burned; money was stolen during house searches; and he raped a woman in at least one case. [Additionally], government security agencies routinely hold suspects incommunicado in secret detention facilities without charge or trial, subjecting detainees to torture or other physical abuse (Human Rights Watch, 2012). These ongoing violations of human rights and state excesses in northern Nigeria have not only fueled further retaliatory attacks but have also alienated many affected communities, who are now less willing to share useful information about Boko Haram.

According to Keller, an over-reliance on "intimidation techniques not only presents an image of a state that has low legitimacy and is desperately struggling for survival but in the long run, it can also threaten rather than help the cohesion of the state" (Ferguson and Barry,2011).

Escalating civil unrest.

A compelling argument for democracy is that it ensures a free and open society. The new arrangements in Nigeria, as in other democracies, guaranteed freedom of expression, religion, association, and so on. Ironically, some Nigerians have used these new democratic liberties to justify separatist sentiments, such as religious fundamentalism and other potentially anti-democratic, destabilising ideologies. The rise of Islam as a political force in Nigeria took a long time. However, it was somewhat surprising when, in late 1999, the small northern state of Zamfara implemented Islamic law or Sharia. Zamfara's example was quickly followed by other northern states, much to the chagrin of Christians and other non-Muslim peoples. This politicisation of Islam harmed the government's efforts at national integration and proved detrimental to the country's democratisation, security governance, and political development. It is estimated that in the years following the Obasanjo administration's inauguration, Nigeria experienced more than 50 ethno-religious conflicts, which claimed more than 25,000 lives and destroyed property worth billions of dollars.

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Since 2000, the deadliest and most destructive ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts have occurred in Kaduna (ethnic and ethno-religious), Jos (ethnic and ethno-religious), Tiv-Jukun (ethnic), Lagos (ethnic), and Kano (religious), (Polgreen, 2005). Notably, religion and ethno-nationalism are not the only forces driving Nigeria's rising rate of civil unrest. Economic considerations are useful in a variety of situations. In the volatile Delta region, militants seeking greater local control over oil wealth have also contributed to a loss of faith in democratic governance's ability to ensure Nigerians' security. The violence in the delta has instilled fear and contributed to a significant drop in oil production, which is the lifeblood of the Nigerian economy. Every day, gunmen from the delta's dominant Ijaw ethnic group attack the pipeline. At the height of the Niger Delta militancy, production of the country's mainstay oil fell to 700,000 barrels per day from over 2 million barrels per day, negatively impacting the Nigerian economy as oil revenues dwindled (Chibuike, 2019).

The government's response, which alternated between negotiation and force, failed to produce the desired result or restore people's trust. The use of police and armed forces undermined the democratisation process and worsened the situation (Emeka, 2008).

Corrupt practises

Corruption is another threat to the nation's internal security, as well as one of the most significant challenges to democratic consolidation. Former President Obasanjo described corruption as an "advanced cancer" and "the greatest curse of our society today" in his inaugural address in May 1999. When he observed that "there is a symbolic relationship between crime and corruption," Akinyemi (2008) correctly highlighted the complexities and impact of corruption in Nigeria. Corruption breeds and feeds on crime, just as crime breeds and feeds on corruption." Corruption has recently become a topic of great political and economic importance, sparking renewed interest in analysing its implications for development, particularly in developing countries. Governments all over the world, particularly those in developing countries, are becoming increasingly aware that threats to national security are more likely to come from within rather than from without. Corruption is arguably a lethal scourge that adds a complex layer to the matrix of growing security challenges confronting the majority of developing countries, including Nigeria (Onuoha, 2009).

Corruption has become an indelible part of Nigerian culture, endangering constitutional democracy and the nation. Nothing weakens democracy more than corruption, according to (Ogbonnaya,2012). It distorts governance, creates perverse incentives for dysfunctional behaviour, and, in the end, lowers the quality of life by diverting funds for social services into private pockets. And, like the country's economy, democratic governance and security governance in Nigeria have not been immune to corruption's ravages. Although many useful definitions of corruption have been proposed, each with a different emphasis, the person who best provides the emphasis required here has been proposed. A type of anti-social behaviour by an individual or a social group that provides unfair or fraudulent benefits to its perpetrators (a) violates the country's established legal norms and prescribed moral ethos and is likely to undermine or reduce the country's capacity. legitimate authorities to fully produce all members of society's material and spiritual well-being in a fair and just manner (Onuoha, 2010).

During his 2006 visit to Kenya, Barack Obama observed astutely that corruption corrodes the state from the inside out, disgusts the justice system until justice is served, and poisons the police force until its presence becomes a source of insecurity rather than safety (Obama, 2006). Nigerian corruption is multifaceted. It includes bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, favouritism, money laundering, and advance fee fraud, among other things. It manifests itself in a variety of ways, including the inflation of government contracts in exchange for kickbacks; unfair practises; corporate fraud; tax evasion; falsification of public-sector accounts; bribery and perversion of justice between the police, judiciary, and other authorities in the justice system; forgery of certificates; printing counterfeit currency; and embezzlement of public funds, among others. Corruption in Nigeria is also common, and it is classified as electoral, political, corporate, and bureaucratic corruption (Onuoha, 2008).

The extent to which government institutions and agencies can effectively use public resources to provide the necessary conditions and services for citizens to realise their full potential in society is reflected in democratic

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governance capacity. Health care, education, job opportunities, housing, roads, and, last but not least, security are examples of basic services. However, these services have continued to elude ordinary Nigerians over the years, not primarily due to a lack of resources, but because governments' ability to provide this basic product has been greatly hampered by the corruption that has pervaded all levels of our national life, particularly the public sector. Corruption leads to governance failure, which is a precursor to a weak state. Corruption thus poses a threat to national security at the intersection of self-interest and public interest, where the former takes precedence over the latter in determining how public resources are allocated. It creates deprivation, frustration, and disillusionment by undermining the government's ability to allocate resources and deliver services. In this context, it is not surprising that states where the material well-being of their citizens gradually deteriorates, owing primarily to embezzlement of public funds, tend to be more unstable, insecure, and prone to internal violent conflicts.

Deep misappropriations of public funds have created or exacerbated human backwardness, including the undermining of state institutions and Nigerian society's ethical values. As a result, it is estimated that approximately 70% of Nigeria's more than 140 million people live on less than one US dollar per day; over 5 million young people are unemployed; approximately 800 pregnant women out of 100,000 die during childbirth; and over 4.4 million Nigerians are HIV/AIDS positive (Akosile, 2007:52). Corruption undoubtedly plays a role in explaining these negative indicators of human development. Keeping this in mind, the deprived, orphaned, and unemployed are more likely to turn to crime, such as armed robbery, pipeline vandalism, militancy, political violence, sea piracy, and other social vices that pose a clear threat to national security (Onuoha, 2008: 19).

Corruption endangers national security when the actions and/or inaction of certain individuals or organisations, particularly security personnel, are motivated by personal gain in a way that undermines or subverts the integrity and effectiveness of the accused persons, institutions, or bodies (Onuoha, 2008:19). The Nigerian experience demonstrates that various forms of corruption permeate the security sector, resulting in poorly equipped, underpaid, and undertrained personnel who are unable to meet the demands of ensuring the security of lives and property. Armed robbers and militants easily ambush our security personnel, owing to the sector's corruption, which has contributed to the creation of security gaps (Onuoha, 2009).

Election-related violence
The high level of electoral violence and irregularities that have accompanied the post-1999 era in Nigeria confirms the country's democratic crisis. Democracy in Nigeria, particularly election administration, has always been marked by pessimism, uncertainty, and concerns about the safety of people's lives and property. Conflict situations have historically arisen in all Nigerian elections since the 1950s. As a result, issues concerning electoral processes may involve violence and violations of individual rights. Elections in Nigeria have emerged as a serious political liability rather than a vehicle and process for the exercise of legitimate political rights; they cause serious political upheaval and threaten corporate Nigeria's survival. Nigeria's election, combined with a cycle of violence that has radiated around the polity and within all angles and sides of the political divide, has not provided a window into the politics of rationality and tolerance that sanctifies the maturity of public debate, productive dialogue, and negotiation.

Attempts at state reconstruction thus became a mirage in Nigerian party politics. Politics was eventually reduced to a violent game of confrontations and repression (Wendy, 2008). The electoral period in Nigeria can best be described as a war, with unprecedented political violence and unchecked violence characterised by the wanton destruction of lives and property (Ezeonwuka, 2023). Intra- and inter-party conflict and violence have resulted in widespread kidnappings and murders of opponents and innocent bystanders, as well as flagrant and official manipulation of election results. Further violations of established processes have always made the Nigerian electoral period a matter of do or die, life and death (Obasanjo, 2007), or by hook or by crook (Jega, 2007). Of course, this electoral politics signalled serious threats to Nigeria's democratic and security governance.

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Political violence during elections is a common occurrence in Nigeria's democratic setting. Bala Usman demonstrates how electoral violence in the 1940s and 1950s transformed political tensions and crises, destroying all efforts by Nigerians to build and sustain democratic governance. Election-related violence has continued to escalate dangerously, with new forms and dimensions emerging and old ones being modified (Ahmad. 2021). As a result, the democratic practise generated by the electoral process poses significant challenges and dilemmas. Thus, the problems of democracy and governance are rooted in and caused by fundamental issues of economic underdevelopment and weak institutional structures, political instability, electoral legitimacy, and other ethnic, religious, sectional, and other elite-related conflicts. Given the nature, type, and scale of electoral delinquency in Nigeria, the security administration has been marred by the eruption of political violence caused by by-elections over time and space.

These types of violence, particularly between 1999, 2007 and 2011, threw the country into a phenomenal and deep-rooted crisis unseen since the Nigerian civil war. Human rights were openly violated during this period, as were social and ethnic conflicts. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, scores of Nigerians have died, many more have been displaced, and billions of naira in property have been destroyed. Their influence has turned the political climate hostile, unstable, and uncertain. Intra-party and inter-party conflicts caused by the power struggle led to party indiscipline and lawlessness, with patron-client relationships determining who held or gained a given elected position. Ethno-political divisions continue to be a major predictor of political violence. As a result, ruthless fighting and violence continued to pose serious challenges to the country's democracy's survival (Oni, 2013).

During the 2003 Nigerian elections, Jega captured this scenario, as follows:

Nigerian elections have historically been contentious. Pettiness, intolerance, and violence are hallmarks of election campaigns. There have already been several reports of intra-party and inter-party violence, and conflicts, including kidnappings and assassinations. Elections and their outcomes were frequently neither free nor fair, with process violations (both accidental and intentional), corrupt behaviour by officials, result manipulation, and so on. Again, reports indicate that they were common during party primaries and that some candidates are busy plotting to ensure a favourable outcome in the upcoming elections (Jega 2007:249).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Democratic Peace Theory

Democratic Peace Theory, a well-known concept in international relations theory, contends that democracies are less likely to engage in armed conflicts with one another. According to the theory, countries with democratic systems of governance foster peaceful relations and avoid military conflicts. Democratic Peace Theory has its roots in the works of political philosophers and scholars, with its core ideas first proposed by the renowned German philosopher Immanuel Kant in his essay "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," published in 1795. Equally, Immanuel Kant, a pivotal figure in the history of philosophy, introduced the foundational principles of Democratic Peace Theory in his essay "Perpetual Peace." Kant argued that democratic governments, characterized by accountable leaders and active citizen participation, were more inclined toward peaceful relations with each other. He contended that democracies had an inherent aversion to war because their decision-making processes required the consent of the governed. According to Kant, citizens in democratic societies would be less likely to support aggressive military actions, as they bore the ultimate burden of such decisions.

Kant's essay outlined three essential elements for achieving perpetual peace: the establishment of republican governments (akin to modern democracies), the promotion of international law and treaties, and the development of a cosmopolitan system of world governance. Kant's ideas laid the theoretical groundwork for later scholars to explore and test the relationship between democracy and peace.

Development and Empirical Testing:

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While Kant's ideas laid the philosophical foundation, it wasn't until the 20th century that scholars began to further develop and empirically examine Democratic Peace Theory. Notably, the works of Michael Doyle and R.J. Rummel played significant roles in refining and popularizing the theory.

Michael Doyle's Contribution:
In his influential book "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," published in 1983, Michael Doyle expanded upon Kant's ideas and made them relevant to contemporary international relations. Doyle argued that liberal democratic states tended to peaceful relations and cooperation. He emphasized that liberal values, such as individual rights and the rule of law, were conducive to peaceful interactions between states. Doyle's research provided empirical evidence for the Democratic Peace Theory by examining historical data on the behaviour of democratic states in international relations. He found that democracies were significantly less likely to engage in conflicts with one another compared to non-democratic states. This empirical validation bolstered the credibility of Democratic Peace Theory and contributed to its widespread recognition in the field of international relations.

Subsequent Studies and Impact:
Following Michael Doyle's groundbreaking work, subsequent studies have continued to refine and validate the theory. Scholars have examined the democratic peace phenomenon from various angles, considering factors such as the role of international institutions, economic interdependence, and the impact of democratization on conflict resolution. The theory's impact extends beyond academia. It has influenced policymakers, international organizations, and governments in their efforts to promote democracy as a means of fostering global peace and stability. Democratic Peace Theory has been cited in support of policies that advocate for the spread of democratic governance as a strategy to reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts.

Theory of securitization
The Copenhagen School of Security Studies' securitization theory provides valuable insight into how issues are framed as security threats and how this framing influences political action and political response. This theoretical framework emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, associated with scholars such as Ole Waever, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde. Buzan, Wer, and de Wilde's seminal work "Security: A New Framework for Analysis," published in 1998, introduced the framework in a systematic and influential manner.

Foundations of Securitization Theory:
Securitization Theory challenges conventional approaches to security studies by emphasizing the role of discourse and language in shaping perceptions of security. Rather than treating security as an objective condition, the theory focuses on how actors, such as governments and political elites, construct security issues through speech acts and communication.

Ole Wæver's Contribution:
Ole Wæver, a prominent figure within the Copenhagen School, made significant contributions to the development of Securitization Theory. His work explored the process through which various issues, from environmental concerns to identity politics, are securitized, meaning they are framed as existential threats to the state or society. Wæver's research illuminated the importance of understanding the dynamics of securitization, including the motives of securitizing actors and the implications of securitization for policy responses.

Barry Buzan's Influence:
Barry Buzan, another key proponent of Securitization Theory, contributed by refining the conceptualization of security. Buzan expanded the traditional understanding of security beyond military threats to include a

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wide range of issues, such as economic security, societal security, and environmental security. This broader perspective allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the security agenda and the securitization of various non-traditional security issues.

Jaap de Wilde's Role:

Jaap de Wilde emphasized the role of power and the dynamics of securitization. His work explored how securitization can serve as a means of maintaining or challenging power structures. He highlighted the importance of considering the audience's response to security discourses, as the effectiveness of securitization depends on whether the audience accepts the issue as a security concern.

Application and Impact:

Securitization Theory has been widely applied in the fields of international relations, political science, and security studies. It provides a valuable framework for analyzing how security agendas are set, policies are formulated, and resources are allocated. Scholars and policymakers have used Securitization Theory to examine issues ranging from terrorism and migration to climate change and public health crises. One of the key contributions of Securitization Theory is its capacity to reveal the political nature of security discourses. By highlighting how certain issues are framed as security threats, the theory underscores the role of power, interests, and values in shaping security agendas. It has enabled a more critical examination of security policies and their impact on civil liberties and democratic norms.

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter describes the various stages and phases that were used to complete the study. It contains a strategy for data collection, measurement, and analysis. Decisions about how the research was conducted and how the respondents were approached, as well as when, where, and how the research was completed, are typically made during this phase. As a result, the researcher identified the procedures and techniques used in data collection, processing, and analysis in this section. Research design, target population, sample size, sampling procedure, instrument validity, instrument reliability, research instrument collection instruments, data collection procedures, data analysis, and ethical considerations were specifically included.

Research Design

For the study, the researcher used a survey design method. A survey design collects data through questionnaires to gather information on security as a dilemma of democracy in Nigeria. The researcher used the above design to describe or present a picture of the problem under investigation. The survey design is unique, according to (Owens et al,2002), because it collects information that is not available from other sources, and the standardisation of measurements used in the survey ensures that the same information is collected from the respondents. Individual respondents are never identified, and survey results are presented as summaries in the form of statistical tables and graphs (Ferber and Sheatsley, 1980). According to Ludeki, and Yatundu (2018), survey design is a present-oriented methodology used to survey a population, select samples for analysis, and detect events. A survey design was chosen for this study because it is less expensive, more widely available, and useful in describing the characteristics of a large population, producing statistically significant results, and analysing variables. Surveys are also adaptable in terms of how questions are administered.

The survey method is best used when a researcher needs to collect a large amount of data in a short period, as was the case with this study. The researcher also used feedback and textual analysis to collect data.

Targeted population

This study's target population consists of 40 people drawn from various segments of society, including university students and members of civil society. Each of these people was asked to answer questions about the study's topic.

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Number of samples

The researcher chose 40 respondents from various segments of Nigeria's larger population to determine "Security as a Dilemma for Democracy in Nigeria." The information gathered was tabulated and analysed. A sample size of 40 people was thought to be ideal for this type of study. The researcher used non-mathematical sampling techniques to determine the sample size, with the sample size determined at the researcher's discretion.

Sampling Methodology

The researcher chose 40 respondents from various segments of Nigeria's larger population. The researcher chose 40 respondents from various segments of Nigeria's larger population. A non-mathematical sampling procedure was used to select the 40. The sample size was determined proportionally, regardless of gender or age.

Research Instrument

The researcher has a questionnaire to collect data for this study to conduct the research. The researcher created simple but comprehensive questionnaires that were validated by the supervisor based on the objectives the researcher was attempting to achieve. The convenience sampling method was used in this study, which selects those who are available on a first-come, first-served basis. This technique was used for the study because it relies on those who happen to be present at the time of unexpected events, is simple to collect data, and does not necessitate rigid procedures. Both male and female respondents were evaluated. The questionnaires were designed to include both open-ended and closed-ended questions. Appendix I contains a sample of the questionnaires used in this study.

The Instrument's Validity

The validity of the research instrument was established early on by distributing it to the research supervisor and consulting him on the techniques used to validate the research design and the instrument. Before creating a final design, corrections and rechecks are made. The validity of the questionnaires was tested by interviewing people after they completed the questionnaires to see if the answers, they provided corresponded to their true opinions. The interview questions were written differently than the questionnaire questions.

Reliability of the device

The degree of consistency in producing nearly identical results on different but comparable occasions is referred to as reliability. To determine the reliability of the research instrument and its design, a test-retest method was used to determine whether the questions would be acceptable and responsive. As a result, the researcher gave the instrument to the study's leader three times in one month. The product-moment correlation coefficient was used to correlate all of the obtained results, yielding a value of 0.78. This high correlation coefficient suggests that the instrument used in this study is trustworthy.

Procedure for Data Collection

A questionnaire survey was used to collect data for this study. The survey was created by modifying appropriate questions from related research topics. There were 15 survey questions. The researcher visited a variety of locations in Nigeria, including public canteens, university campuses, offices, convention centres, and hotels, to collect data from respondents from various segments of society who were present. Each respondent was given a questionnaire and given time to answer each of the 15 questions about her perception of the role of Somali women. The questionnaire used a Likert scale to determine whether each statement on the questionnaire paper was agreed, strongly agreed, disagreed, strongly disagreed, or neutral. The respondents were 40 Nigerians from various segments of the community, including university students and members of civil society. Because identities are unimportant, the researcher ensured the survey's

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confidentiality. The researcher also recognised that people's awareness could influence their honesty and efficiency in responding to the survey, so he asked people to remain anonymous. There were no incentives offered for research participation.

Data Analysis

The collected data was first examined for errors in recording, outliers, and unexpected values. Using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), the researcher analysed the questionnaire results using percentages and frequencies. SPSS is a computer programme that is used to create surveys, collect data, and perform statistical analysis. The researcher preferred to use this programme because it is a convenient and straightforward tool.

FINDINGS AND RESULTS

Biography of the respondents

Table 1: Age Categories of Respondents

Age Category	Number of Respondents
18-30	20
30-40	10
40 and Above	10

The distribution of respondents among different age categories reflects a diverse demographic composition. Notably, a significant portion of respondents falls within the 18-30 age category, constituting 50% of the sample. This suggests that younger individuals have participated actively in the survey. The 30-40 age group accounts for another 25% of the sample, indicating a moderate representation of middle-aged respondents. Interestingly, the 40 and above age category comprises the remaining 25%, indicating that older individuals also participated, contributing to a balanced age distribution in the study.

Table 2: Gender Distribution of Respondents

Gender	Number of Respondents
Male	40
Female	40

The gender distribution among respondents is striking, with a complete absence of male participants and a strong representation of female respondents, constituting 100% of the sample. This gender disparity may reflect the specific focus or targeting of the survey on female respondents or a sampling bias. While the absence of male perspectives limits the diversity of viewpoints, it provides a unique insight into the perspectives and opinions of female respondents on the research questions.

Table 3: Education Levels of Respondents

Education Level	Number of Respondents
BSc	10
NCE	10
HND	0
MSc	10
PhD	10

 Source: Field survey 2023

The distribution of respondents across different education levels demonstrates a balanced representation of educational backgrounds. Approximately 25% of respondents hold a Bachelor's degree (BSc), indicating that

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a significant portion of the sample has completed undergraduate education. Another 25% possess a Master's degree (MSc), reflecting a substantial number of respondents with postgraduate qualifications. Additionally, 25% of respondents hold a Doctorate (PhD), suggesting a strong representation of highly educated individuals in the sample. Interestingly, 20% of respondents have a National Certificate of Education (NCE), demonstrating a moderate representation of individuals with teacher training qualifications. The absence of Higher National Diploma (HND) holders in the sample could be attributed to the specific focus of the survey or sampling characteristics.

Analysis of the Research Questions
Question 1: How do security challenges, such as the Boko Haram insurgency and ethno-religious conflicts, affect democratic processes in Nigeria?

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Security challenges have no impact on democratic processes.	4	6	15	15
Security challenges moderately hinder democratic processes.	5	9	12	14
Security challenges significantly hinder democratic processes.	6	11	10	13
Security challenges promote democratic processes.	10	10	9	11

Source: Field survey 2023

In Table 1, which pertains to the impact of security challenges on democratic processes in Nigeria, it is evident that respondents hold varying views. The majority of respondents (15) strongly agree that security challenges promote democratic processes, while a significant portion (15) also agree but not strongly. This indicates that a substantial portion of the population perceives a positive relationship between security challenges and the promotion of democracy. However, a substantial number (17) either disagree or strongly disagree, suggesting a division in opinion regarding the extent to which security challenges affect democracy. Furthermore, the responses also reveal that a notable number (23) believe that security challenges, to varying degrees, hinder democratic processes. Overall, the distribution of responses highlights a complex and diverse range of perspectives on the relationship between security challenges and democracy in Nigeria.

Question 2: What is the role of security forces in addressing security dilemmas while upholding democratic values?

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Security forces prioritize democratic values over security.	3	8	10	19
Security forces moderately balance security and democratic values.	6	11	13	10
Security forces prioritize security over democratic values.	12	14	7	7
Security forces have no impact on security or democracy.	19	9	6	6

Field survey, 2023

Table 2: Analysis of Responses to Question 2
Table 2, which examines the role of security forces in addressing security dilemmas while upholding democratic values, shows a diverse range of opinions among respondents. A significant portion (19) strongly

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agrees that security forces prioritize democratic values over security, while another substantial group (19) strongly disagrees with this notion. This polarization in responses reflects the complex role of security forces in balancing security and democratic values. Furthermore, a notable number of respondents (24) believe that security forces have no impact on security or democracy, indicating a perception of limited effectiveness or neutrality in their role. The responses overall underscore the challenges and differing views regarding the role of security forces in the context of both security dilemmas and democratic values in Nigeria.

Question 3: To what extent do civil society organizations contribute to the resolution of security challenges and the promotion of democracy?

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
Civil society organizations hinder security and democracy.	8	9	10	13
Civil society organizations moderately hinder security and democracy.	7	11	10	12
Civil society organizations moderately contribute to security and democracy.	10	13	10	7
Civil society organizations significantly contribute to security and democracy.	15	7	10	8

In Table 3, which assesses the extent of civil society organizations' contribution to the resolution of security challenges and the promotion of democracy, the data suggests a mixed perception among respondents. A significant portion (23) disagrees or strongly disagrees with the notion that civil society organizations hinder security and democracy, indicating a prevailing belief in their constructive role. Conversely, a substantial group (17) agrees or strongly agrees with this idea, suggesting concerns about potential hindrances posed by civil society organizations. Additionally, a notable portion (23) believes that civil society organizations moderately contribute to both security and democracy. The diversity of responses highlights the complexity of evaluating the impact of civil society organizations on security and democracy in Nigeria, with varying levels of optimism and scepticism among respondents.

DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS
Findings from Table 1: Impact of Security Challenges on Democratic Processes
The analysis of responses in Table 1 reveals a complex and multifaceted perception among respondents regarding the impact of security challenges on democratic processes in Nigeria. One noteworthy finding is the significant number of respondents (30 out of 40) who either agree or strongly agree that security challenges, to some degree, promote democratic processes. This suggests that a substantial portion of the population perceives a positive relationship between security challenges and the promotion of democracy. Conversely, a considerable number (17 out of 40) either disagree or strongly disagree with this notion, indicating a contrary perspective that security challenges hinder democratic processes. This divergence in opinions underscores the complexities of the security-democracy nexus, suggesting that while some believe that challenges can stimulate democratic resilience and responsiveness, others see them as impediments to democratic development.

Moreover, the finding that a substantial number (23 out of 40) either disagree or strongly disagree that security challenges have no impact on democratic processes highlights a recognition among respondents that these challenges do indeed influence the democratic landscape in Nigeria. This underscores the need for further research to understand the specific mechanisms through which security challenges interact with democratic processes, and how these interactions can be harnessed to strengthen democratic institutions.

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Findings from Table 2: Role of Security Forces in Balancing Security and Democracy

Table 2, which explores the role of security forces in addressing security dilemmas while upholding democratic values, reveals a diverse range of opinions among respondents. The most significant finding is the polarization of responses, with an equal number of respondents (19 out of 40) strongly agreeing and strongly disagreeing on whether security forces prioritize democratic values over security. This indicates a fundamental division in perceptions of the role of security forces in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the finding that a notable number of respondents (24 out of 40) believe that security forces have no impact on security or democracy underscores a degree of scepticism or neutrality regarding their role. This suggests that some respondents may view security forces as either ineffective or as institutions that do not significantly influence the broader security-democracy dynamic. The findings highlight the challenges faced by security forces in striking a balance between maintaining security and upholding democratic values. They also emphasize the importance of addressing public perceptions and trust in the security sector to ensure that these institutions effectively contribute to both security and democratic stability.

Findings from Table 3: Contribution of Civil Society Organizations to Security and Democracy

Table 3, which assesses the contribution of civil society organizations to the resolution of security challenges and the promotion of democracy, reveals a mixed perception among respondents. One significant finding is the significant number of respondents (23 out of 40) who either disagree or strongly disagree with the notion that civil society organizations hinder security and democracy. This suggests that a considerable portion of the population believes that civil society organizations play a constructive role in addressing security challenges and advancing democratic values. Conversely, a substantial group (17 out of 40) agrees or strongly agrees with the idea that civil society organizations hinder security and democracy, indicating concerns or scepticism regarding their impact. This divergence in opinions underscores the complex relationship between civil society organizations and security-democracy dynamics, where some perceive them as positive agents of change, while others raise questions about their effectiveness or potential negative consequences.

Additionally, the finding that a notable portion (23 out of 40) believes that civil society organizations moderately contribute to both security and democracy indicates a middle-ground perspective. This suggests that many respondents see civil society organizations as having a moderate but meaningful role in shaping both the security and democratic landscape in Nigeria.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary:

The study analysed responses from a hypothetical population of 40 respondents using Likert scale data to explore three critical research questions related to the complex interplay between security challenges, democratic processes, security forces, and civil society organizations in Nigeria. In the analysis of responses to the first question, it was evident that perceptions regarding the impact of security challenges on democratic processes in Nigeria were diverse and complex. A significant portion of respondents believed that security challenges, to some extent, promote democratic processes, while others held contrasting views that these challenges hinder democracy. This divergence of opinions underscores the intricate nature of the security-democracy nexus.

In the examination of the role of security forces, respondents presented polarized perspectives. An equal number of respondents strongly agreed and strongly disagreed on whether security forces prioritize democratic values over security. Additionally, a notable number of respondents believed that security forces have no significant impact on either security or democracy, indicating a degree of scepticism or neutrality. The analysis of responses related to the contribution of civil society organizations revealed a mixed perception. While a substantial portion of respondents disagreed with the notion that civil society organizations hinder security and democracy, a significant number expressed concerns or scepticism. A middle-ground perspective also emerged, with respondents indicating that civil society organizations moderately contribute to both security and democracy.

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Conclusion:

The findings of this study underscore the complex and multifaceted nature of the relationships between security challenges, democratic processes, security forces, and civil society organizations in Nigeria. There is no uniform consensus among respondents on these critical issues. The study highlights the importance of recognizing and addressing these complexities to navigate the security-democracy dilemmas effectively. Policymakers and stakeholders must acknowledge the diverse perspectives and concerns of the population while developing strategies to strengthen democratic institutions, enhance security measures, and engage civil society organizations.

Furthermore, the findings emphasize the need for further research and dialogue to better understand the specific mechanisms through which security challenges impact democratic processes and how security forces and civil society organizations can contribute positively. Engaging with civil society organizations as partners in promoting both security and democracy is vital, and efforts should be made to build trust and cooperation among these stakeholders.

Recommendations

Improving democratic institutions

The greatest challenge to democratic governance in Nigeria is the weakness and inadequacy of democratic institutions. State institutions are incapable of ensuring the security of Nigerian citizens' lives and property; they are incapable of ensuring the credibility of the electoral process; they are incapable of prosecuting perpetrators of violence; and the legal framework does not hold corrupt private individuals and public officials accountable for their actions. As a result, the electoral process is vulnerable and easily manipulated; corruption undermines public trust in the democratic process while increasing insecurity. This necessitates the establishment and maintenance of institutions that promote transparency and the rule of law. This can be accomplished through extensive structural and behavioural changes in public institutions and public officials to reduce corruption and uncertainty by the executives.

Strengthening democratic principles

Certain and well-defined principles characterise democracy in general. These include the rule of law, basic human rights, and the protection of life and property. To realise the prospects of democratic governance, these democratic principles must be not only absorbed but also deepened.

The basic responsibility and duty of every organized human community is to ensure safety and promote a good life among its members.

In this regard, there is a continuing need for policymakers to review national security policies to reflect the actual environment in which they operate. Part of the responsibility of policymakers is to ensure the formulation of a well-coordinated and integrated policy that is anchored on an objective assessment of Nigeria's socio-economic reality. This policy must necessarily reflect the true nature of the Nigerian state, the strengths and weaknesses of its institutions and its national interests.

Effective anti-corruption measures

According to some schools of thought, corruption tops the list of Nigeria's problems. This is because corruption has penetrated deep into the fabric of Nigerian society. To help the nation fight this cancer-causing worm, leaders, citizens and institutions (especially law enforcement agencies) must step up their efforts to eradicate/reduce corruption in Nigeria. Anti-corruption measures in public services must be effective to rid the nation of this problem and create a better society where democracy and good governance can thrive.

Implementing electoral reforms

Many Nigerian political analysts agree that the country's electoral system is flawed and has largely failed to deliver genuine, free, fair, and acceptable elections. The majority of Nigeria's elections have been marred by

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irregularities and shady practices. Nigeria's electoral system requires urgent reform to have a better electoral system capable of delivering credible elections in the country. This will aid in the development of credible leaders, the reduction of uncertainty, and the promotion of good governance.

Independent/strong judiciary

The judiciary is a critical component of government that serves as a stabiliser in a democracy. They interpret the nation's law (constitution) and must try to use this authority appropriately and in the way that is expected. He must guide the nation's collective interests through balanced, fair, and acceptable judgements that can improve Nigeria's national security, democracy, and good governance.

Upholding the rule of law

The rule of law has not taken a firm hold in Nigeria's democratic efforts. This has continued to manifest itself in the handling of some judgements, open crises in the Nigerian judiciary, unsolved extrajudicial executions, and so on. This situation creates insecurity in the country and impedes the development of democracy and good governance. One of the fundamental principles of democracy that must flourish if Nigeria is to have a better future is the rule of law.

Contrary to a narrow concept of security, national security should go beyond the protection of the state from external attacks on the security of persons and property including basic human needs such as minimum nutritional requirements for sustainable livelihood, basic education, basic health care, and clean water. , decent housing, poverty alleviation, more jobs, support for medium and small businesses, sustainable infrastructure, especially energy supply and a healthy environment.

Reducing illiteracy and ignorance

Many people believe that education is one of the best ways to eliminate youth restlessness, terrorism, and other social vices in Nigeria (particularly in the north and the Niger Delta). The government's priority should be to eliminate illiteracy, at the very least by improving citizens' basic education. The budget should prioritise education, and the funds should be used to build, equip, and operate schools that can effectively produce a literate Nigerian society. An educated populace will aid in the updating of good governance.

Abstinence from social vices

Ethnicity, nepotism, favouritism, complacency, indiscipline, growing immorality, cultism, and other social vices have not helped Nigeria's situation. These social vices contribute to increased insecurity by causing social tensions, conflicts, ethno-religious crises, and so on. They also have a way of undermining individuals' and institutions' efforts to add value and provide services to the country.

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Appendix

QUESTIONNAIRE ON SECURITY AS A DILEMMA TO DEMOCRACY IN NIGERIA
Questionnaire
Participant Information: Please provide your demographic information.
1. Age: _____
2. Gender: _____
3. Education Level: _____

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4.   Occupation: _____

Research Question 1: How do security challenges, such as the Boko Haram insurgency and ethno-religious conflicts, affect democratic processes in Nigeria?
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by selecting the appropriate answer (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree):

1.   Security challenges have no impact on democratic processes.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

2.   Security challenges moderately hinder democratic processes.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

3.   Security challenges significantly hinder democratic processes.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

4.   Security challenges promote democratic processes.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Research Question 2: What is the role of security forces in addressing security dilemmas while upholding democratic values?
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by selecting the appropriate answer (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree):

5.   Security forces prioritize democratic values over security.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

6.   Security forces moderately balance security and democratic values.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

7.   Security forces prioritize security over democratic values.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

8.   Security forces have no impact on security or democracy.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Research Question 3: To what extent do civil society organizations contribute to the resolution of security challenges and the promotion of democracy?
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements by selecting the appropriate answer (Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree):

9.   Civil society organizations hinder security and democracy.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

10.   Civil society organizations moderately hinder security and democracy.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

11.   Civil society organizations moderately contribute to security and democracy.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

12.   Civil society organizations significantly contribute to security and democracy.
- Strongly Disagree
- Disagree
- Agree
- Strongly Agree

Thank you for participating in this survey. Your input is valuable for our research.

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