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AN APPRAISAL OF NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR AND INDIGENOUS TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

This study is about Nigeria-Biafra war, which was fought from 1967-1970. The main thrust of the study was to examine the Nigeria-Biafra war and indigenous technological development. The secessionist side (Biafra) the former Eastern region of the Federal Republic of Nigeria had entered the war quite unprepared in terms of quality and quantity of war infrastructure. It would be quite unimaginable for anyone, nation, state or people to engage in a combat without adequate preparation. The study therefore examined the Biafra war vis-à-vis indigenous technological development in Nigeria. This is to ascertain whether the abandonment of Biafran military initiative undermined indigenous weapons development in Nigeria. The researchers are of the view that, had the victorious Federal side, in the spirit of national reconciliation embraced and harnessed the Biafra indigenous weapons initiative, Nigeria would have probably joined the league of regional continental and global arms manufacturers. The study is anchored on the Marxian theory of Post-colonial state propounded by HarnzaAlavi's 1972 as its analytical framework of understanding the discourse. The study therefore adopted documentary method of data collection and content analysis for the purpose of analyzing data generated through secondary sources. Finally, the study recommends among others that the Federal government of Nigeria should revisit Biafran war museum in Umuhaia, Abia state, set up special committee of inquiry in order to revamp it for technical military training, rather than depending overtly on importation of military hard and soft wares, with its attendant drain on scarce resources.

Keywords:
Abandonment, Biafra, Coups, Killings, Marginalization, Ogbunigwe.

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Introduction

It is an obvious fact that the corporate existence of Nigeria has its etymological trace to 1914, when British government forcefully amalgamated various ethno-religious groups of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa, Fulani, Izon, Efik, Ibibio, Kanuri, Kambari, Gbaygi and othersinto an entity called Nigeriathrough a British Colonial Governor, Fredrick Lord Lugard on 1st January, 1914 for easy colonial administration (Achebe, 2012). The country gained her political independence in 1960, after much persuasion with the North that had initially refused self-government on the account that they were not ready. Since then, Nigerian political contestation became deeply rooted in major political issues which are violently contested along ethnic, religious and regional boundaries in the country (Oyekanmi, 2021). This, coupled with an inherited constitution from the British government which unjustifiablygave absolute majority (power) to the Northern region thereby promoting more regional politics and political division in the country (Webster, Boahen& Tidy, 1979) (cited in Oyekanmi, 2021, p. 200).

Therefore, the founding factors that led to theNigerian/Biafra war, otherwise known Nigeria Civil War. 1967-1970are inseparable from the obvious and prevailing ethnic, religious and regional distrust between the three major groups of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani in the country. For instance, prior to the civil war, Nigeria had witnessed series of political crises and upheavals,the most prominent amongst them were the Kano Riot of 1953, the Census Crisis of 1962, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 and the Coups and Counter Coups of 1966 (Madiebo, 1980). According to Oyekanmi (2021), the1953 Kano Riot occurred as a suspicion on the part of the Northern leaders that the Southern leaders were trying to force them into a national integration which they were not prepared for. He further maintained that in an attempt to educate the Northerners about the benefits of self-government, the Southern leaders led by ChiefS. L. Akintola of the Action Group went to Kano to gather support, thiseventually led to four days ofrioting at Sabongari, Kano between 16th and 19th of May, 1953. Consequently, the riot apart from loss of lives, worsened the relationship between the Southern and Northern leaders (Gad, 1996). Similarly, the Census Crisis of 1962 was also based on ethnic suspicion, upon which the Southerners assumed that the Census Director had been influenced to perpetuate Northern agenda by influencing the census figures to the advantage of the North. On the other hand, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 was centered on regional politics in which the United Progressive Grand Alliance (comprising of NCNC and AG) and Nigerian National Alliance (comprising of NPC and NNDP) (Oyekanmi, 2021).

In the same vein, while the UPGA is south dominated political party, then NNA appears North dominated party. Upon this background, crises became inevitable, thus leading to coup and counter coup in the country. Therefore, the quest to control the political soul (power) of the country became eminent. As a result, Nigeria witnessedthe first ever

military coup on the 15th January, 1966 led by a small group of army officers, mostly Igbos officers--Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu.

A Vision of a Disunited Nigeria

The coup which some Nigerians, particularly those from other ethnic groups other than the Igbo termed "Igbo coup" on the basis that it was a calculated attempt for the Igbo ascension onto power, as many northern politicians including the Federal Prime Minister and the premiers of the Western and Northern regions were killed in the process, while their Igbo counterparts were spared (Ezeani, 2016).However, other sound minded Nigerians fairly contend that the coup had no ethnic motive but was rather necessitated by the political circumstances of the time. In more clear argument, Ifeajuna (1966) explained the issues that led to the coup as Balewa's regime was characterized by not only north and south problems but also with height of incompetence. Subsequently, another coup took place in July, 1966, thus leading to what Achebe described as an eye-saw pogrom (genocide) (Achebe, 2012), as over 30,000-50, 000 Igbos including women and children residing in the north were killed in one day, apart from over 300 Igbo soldiers who were captured and killed in the same night (Oyekanmi, 2021). This therefore, prompted hundreds of thousands of the Igbos in the north to return to the Southeast where increasingly strong Igbo secessionist emerged on the nerve of the Igbo massacre in the north. Secondly, the July 1966 counter coup that saw the death of General AguiyiIronsi, upon which Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon emerged as Head of Statewas rejected by the Military Governor of Eastern Region, Lt. Col. OdumegwuOjukwu, who rather preferred a senior military officer in the person of Brigadier Ogundipe to succeed Ironsi instead of Gowon. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon as Head of State (Fakayode, 2003). These hostilities according to Ajetunmobi (2001) (cited in Oyekanmi, 2021)were the backdrop upon which the declaration ofthe independent Republic of Biafra by Lt. Col, Ojukwu, the military Governor of Eastern Region on the 6thJuly, 1967, thus, the war broke out through which genocide was committed against the people of the Eastern region, particularly the Igbo.. The war according its effect as meted to the people the Eastern region was described as an "unfortunate Nigerian civil war" as over 3million people majorly Igbos died including women and children. According to Ezeani (2016, p. 131-132) "Giwa Amu, a Solicitor-General, writing in the *Sunday Observer*, March 16, 1983 described how a large number of Mid-western Igbo were slaughtered". He further maintained that "for record purposes, however, let me state fearlesslythat I saw hundreds of unarmed civilians being shot at sight in Benin City when Federal troops arrived to liberate the city from rebel soldiers" (Ezeani, 2016, p. 132).

However, our major concern is never surroundedon the war and its effects, because documentary evidences abound on the effects, onslaught and terrors meted against the people of the Eastern regionduring the war. But, our major concern in this work is on the

technological improvising by theBiafra's scientists and technologists during the war against an obvious non availability of sufficient war materials (ammunitions). Apparently, it is penitent to note that unlike the Biafran side, Nigeria fought the war under a favourable condition of sufficient and sophisticated war ammunitions and international aids.Therefore, it is important to note that the history of Nigerian Civil War was marked by a significant milestone in the military history and diplomatic relations of an independent African State. For instance, it is observed that for the first time during the war, 20th century sophisticated armed technology reached Nigeria in a battlefield where Nigerians met with Nigerians in such an unfortunate conventionalterritorial combat in the part of Nigeria via international assistanceon one end. And the quantities of modern weapons in the Nigerian-Biafra War were not substantial on the part of Biafra, but their impact was great on other end (Oyekanmi, 2021). The above statement implies that Biafra never had much sophisticated arms and ammunitions unlike their Nigeria counterpart. Or in other words, Biafra's armed strength did not match that of the Federal Government of Nigeria, because it (Biafra) was placed on the brink of relative isolation from the rest of the world largely due to persistent Federal blockades (Umoh, 2011). Thistherefore compelled Biafra to be faced with grave difficulties in securing external arms supply and economic assistance from other willing and volunteers nations, yet they were still able to surmount the pressure of the Nigerian military for a period of 30 months through an improvised locally made weapons. The intensity of the war due to lack of conflict capital (arms) subjected the Biafran side to the development of the Biafraninfant arms industry. The infant weapons industry independently produced locally, fabricated hand grenades, cartridges, mines, and guns, with most outstanding being the "Ogbunigwe", which is literally translated to mean mass killer (Umoh, 2011). He further maintained that the aforementioned locally made weapons, particular the Ogbunigwewasfabricated in various shapes and sizes to act as rockets, hand grenades andmines or a surface to air weapon.Furthermore, there werealso considerable advancesmade in the fabrication ofarmoured vehicles from agricultural tractors, bulldozers and harvesters; and were popularly known as*Biafran Red Devil* and*Genocide*(Okigbo, 1989).Aside the above-mentioned technological improvisation development,radio Biafra which was established by the defunct government of the republic of Biafra during the Nigeria-Biafra war on the 30th May, 1967 to champion the Biafran war propaganda (Oyekanmi, 2021) was another record of Biafran technological development during the war.

Prelude to the Nigerian Civil War

The factors that led to the Nigeria-Biafra civil war have been sufficiently explored, but may still be pertinent to be observed in a more rational view point. For instance, it is pertinent to note that since after political independence in 1960, the country had witnessed an inundated host of destabilisation through vary degree of crises, beginning with the

emergency rule in the Western Region in 1962, the census crisis of 1962–63, and the election crisis of 1964–65 (Onuoha, 2018). This following with the intervention of the military on January 15, 1966, which was naively and misinterpreted as Igbo/Eastern-led coup, and counter-coup as a reprisal by Hausa-Fulani/Northern soldiers. This inter-ethnic power struggle between the dominant ethnic groups broadened in scope when it failed to reach a sustainable resolution (Nnoli, 1978). **This f**ollowing a series of failed negotiations, disagreements and differences between General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria's military head of state and Colonel ChukwuemekaOjukwu, the military governor of Nigeria's Eastern Region (Biafra) over the future of Nigeria and its political structure to be adopted for inclusiveness. This therefore, led to an unprecedented marginalization,undue domination through which the F Federal Government of Nigeria lost its effectiveauthority and control over the Eastern Region. Upon which overthrowing of government, secession from the federation, and declaration of the independent State of Biafra on the 30thMay, 1967 was inevitable course.

Thus, the end of the Nigeria-Biafra War was marked by the magnanimous proclamation of "no victor, no vanquished" by the General Yakubu Gowon-led Federal Military Government (FMG), which was widely and unreservedly welcomed. Furthermore, this was immediately followed by the popular 3Rs policy with its policy thrust of reconciling, rehabilitating, and reconstructing the highly affected region of Eastern region during the war. According toUbi (2020), such national declaration by Gowon was meant to alleviate the harsh conditions of surrender, guaranteed the personal safety and security of the Easterners, especially Igbo and their properties, the right to reside and work anywhere in Nigeria on one end, and the reabsorption of civil/public servants of Igbo extraction into the civil service and the military, and the granting of general amnesty to the secessionist Easterners on the other end.

However, this appears unrealistic figment, as the defeated Biafra was to experience another dimension of marginalization and segregation thereafter particularly in the area of re-absorption into the workforce (civil/public service) of the country (Ubi, 2020). In a similar vein, Onuoha (2018) maintained that even with the various policies by the Federal Government to reunite the country into an indivisible entity, the Igbos were still highly displaced from the formal sectors of the economy. This leading to the Igbos into the informal sector and long-distance trading networks outside the state structures on one hand, and waste of knowledge used during the war on the other hand. Hence, we pose the following research questions:

1. Does abandonment of Biafran military initiative undermine indigenous weapons development in Nigeria?
2. Does ethnic politics undermine harnessing Biafra technological development in Nigeria

Causes of the Nigeria-Biafra war, 1967-70

It obvious to note that, the Nigerian civil war was a cataclysm that rocked the emergence of the Nigerian state from 1967 to 1970 (Oyekanmi, 2021). The 30 months civil war which was preceded by a configuration of pre-independence and post-independence crises in

Nigeria (Thomas, 2010). The Origins of the Nigeria-Biafra civil war could be located within the ambit of complexity of factors ranging from the remote which includes the military coups d'état of January 15, and July 29, 1966 (Oyekanmi, 2021). While other remote factors included the regional election crisis in Western Nigeria in 1965; the Tiv riots of 1964; the Federal Elections of 1964; the killing of the Igbos living in Northern Nigeria from May to September 1966; the structural imbalance of the Nigerian federation; and, most importantly, the asymmetrical distribution of power among the various ethnic and geopolitical groups (Adeleke, 2008; Cervenka, 1972; Oyeweso, 1992) (cited in Oyekanmi, 2021, p. 202). The above and others are the founding factors that led to the Nigeria-Biafra civil war in 1967-1970. Such factors include the obvious and prevailing ethnic, religious and regional distrust between the three major groups of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani in the country.

Obviously, before the civil war in 1967-70, Nigeria had observed series of political crises and instability ranging from the Kano Riot of 1953, the Census Crisis of 1962, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 and the Coups and Counter Coups of 1966 (Madiebo, 1980). The 1953 Kano Riot which occurred as a suspicion on the part of the Northern leaders that the Southern leaders were trying to force them into a national integration which they were never ready for (Oyekanmi, 2021). Furthermore, in attempt to educate the Northern leaders on the benefits of self-government, the Southern leaders led by Chief S. L. Akintola of the Action Group visited Kano to gather support, this which eventually turned to four days rioting at Sabongari in 1963.

This therefore worsened the relationship between the South and North due to the indiscriminate killings of southerners in the north (Gad, 1996). In the same vein, the Census Crisis of 1962 was also based on ethnic suspicion, upon which the Southerners assumed that the Census Director was influenced to perpetuate Northern agenda by mutilating the census figures in favour of the north. Also, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 which was obviously centered on regional politics in which the United Progressive Grand Alliance (comprising of NCNC and AG) and Nigerian National Alliance (comprising of NPC and NNDP) (Oyekanmi, 2021).

In the same vein, while the UPGA is south dominated political party, then NNA appears north dominated party. Upon this background, crises became inevitable, thus leading to coup and counter coup in the country in the quest for regional political power. Therefore, this resulted in the military coups and counter-coups in the country; prominent among them is the military coup on the 15th January, 1966 led by a small group of army officers, mostly Southeastern Igbos officers--Emmanuel Ifeajuna and Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu. The coup which was naively conceived as "Igbo coup" because many Igbo military officers were involved with few other officers from other tribes (Ezeani, 2016). Subsequently, another coup took place in July, 1966, this was the peak of what led to the Nigeria-Biafra war in 1967, as over 700, 000 Igbos including women and children residing

in the north were killed in one day, apart from over 300 Igbo soldiers who were captured and killed in the same night (Oyekanmi, 2021). Secondly, the July 1966 counter coup that saw the death of General AguiyiIronsi upon which Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was emerged as the Military Head of State was rejected by the Military Governor of Eastern Region, Lt. Col. OdumegwuOjukwu, who rather preferred a senior military officer in the person of Brigadier Ogundipe to succeed Ironsi instead of Gowon (Fakayode, 2003). These hostilities were the background that led to the declaration of the independent Republic of Biafra by Lt. Col, Ojukwu, the military Governor of the Eastern Region on the 6th July, 1967, therefore leading to the outbreak of an unfortunate civil war that saw an indelible injury on the part of the Igbo nation, as genocide was committed against the people of the south-east.

Ethnic Politics in Nigeria

Undoubtedly, Nigeria is by origin a heterogamous and pluralistic society with different ethnic groups, religions, languages, cultures andinstitutional arrangements (Salawu& Hassan, 2011), with Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba as the major ethnic groupings, each interactingwith one another in competition for power quest and wealth.This therefore resulted into sectional and ethnic politics of desiring to control state power. Its sojournbegan from the popular unprecedented forceful amalgamation in1914, which thus ushered-in major political issues which were violently contested along ethnic, religious and regional boundaries in the country. This coupled with an unjustifiable inherited constitution from the British government which gave absolute majority to one region thereby promoting regional politics and political division in the country (Oyekanmi, 2021). Thus, leading to politics of ethnic, regional and religious distrust between the three major groups of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa/Fulani.This therefore, led Nigeria into series of political crises such as theKano Riot in 1953, the Census Crisis of 1962, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 and the Coups and Counter Coups of 1966, amongst others in the country (Oyekanmi, 2021).

Worthy of note, since political independence in 1960, Nigeria had a federal structure that was made up of threeregions of the North, East and the West. Upon this structure came regional politics, which was clearly amplified by the emergence of three regionally-based andtribally/ethnically sustained political parties of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the NationalConvention of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), and the ActionGroup (AG) led by late AlhajiSir AhmaduBello,Sardauna of Sokoto from the North, Dr. Azikwe from theEast and Chief ObafemiAwolowo from the Westrespectively (Salawu& Hassan, 2011).It was against this seemingly simple background thatthe problem of Nigeria's first attempt at democracystarted. For instance, between 1960 and 1965, the real ethnic, tribal and regional politics commenced earnestly at the detriment of the Nigerian nation. Again, in the bid to win the most political power by theseethnic leaders, the situation degenerated

into political violence, arsons, killings and other acts of vandalism across regions (Salawu& Hassan, 2011). This subsequently coupled with bloodymilitary coups and counter coups, upon which ethnic, religious, tribal and regional distrust between the three major groups of Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa/Fulani became inevitable.

Therefore, after the civil war in 1970, even with the national policy of reintegration, the unfortunate ethnic, religious, tribal and regional distrust between the three major groups never cease to exist, particularly against the defeated region of the Secessionist Biafra (the Igbos). For instance, studies have it that despite such national declaration and policy of re-integration, the Igbos were diplomatically displaced from the of the country's formal socio- economic sector even in the face of the national declaration of "no victor, no vanquished", and the popular 3Rs policy of the reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction introduced for the re-amalgamation of the Igbo brothers into the mainstream of the country. The situation which forcefully led them(the Igbos) into informal sector and long-distance trading networks outside the state structures (Oyekanmi, 2021). This therefore, ushered-in another dimension of marginalization, domination, alienation and segregation with untold hardship in their own country (Nigeria)(Ubi, 2020; Onuoha, 2018). The ethnic, religious, tribal and regional distrust commonly existed amongst the groups which led to the civil war in 1967, thus, blindfolded the leadership of the country who after the war abandoned the Biafran military technological initiatives, which would have been a commencement point of Nigerian weapon manufacturing initiative in Africa, amid the incessant internal and external forces.

Ojukwu-Buckets/Airstrip; and Aggression/Terrorism in Nigeria

The Nigerian Civil War of 1967-1970 between Nigeria and the marginalized Biafra led to an obvious unforgettable trade mark of indelible injuries, particularly on the part of the defeated Biafra, upon this; the war was described as an unfortunate eyesore in the history of Nigeria. While the Nigerian side was headed by Yakubu Gowon, the Biafra counterpart was led by OdumegwuOjukwu on the other hand. Thus, the boiling and compelling issue that compounded the war was the desire of Nigeria to prevent Biafra from seceding to form an independent Republic of Biafra, thus following series of post-independence political and ethnic crises between 1960 and 1967 (Umoh, 2011). Therefore, with the outbreak of armed hostilities in 1967, the military capability of both sides was indisputably put into credible test.

Generally, military history often teaches that weapons are of first importance in forwarding success in any war because the result of such war depends largely on weapons sophistication involved (Umoh, 2011). Pathetically, at the onset and even throughout the war, Biafra's armed strength did not match that of the Federal Government due to the brink of relative isolation from the rest of the world through persistent Federal blockades placed the Biafran side on grave difficulties in securing external arms supply and economic

assistance (Ubi, 2020). Upon this, studies have it that the Nigerian side had an overwhelming predominance over Biafra in terms of conflict capital (arms) and conflict labour (soldiers), through which the ratio of the federal fighting forces to that of Biafra was pitched at 120,000 to 40, 000 men (Ubi, 2020). This outrageous and unprecedented imbalance in military arsenals thus posed un-parallel responsibilities, obligations, and opportunities for Biafra to solve at improvising, which significantly induced an unprecedented breakthrough in arms fabrication on the part of Biafra (Umoh, 2011). Such opportunity of arms fabrication was to complement the available military materiel, upon this, an infant arms industry was developed which enhanced the Biafran war effort (Umoh, 2011).

As a result, different types of mass-destruction bombs (Ogbunigwe), particularly the most popular and credible Ojukwu-Buckets were produced by the Biafran science and engineering groups in order to sustain the pressure of the war.The Ojukwu-buckets were quite outstanding due to its effectiveness in the purpose at which it was made and could sustain for days before breaking down (Ubi, 2020). Similarly, the Nigeria-Biafra civil war further provedthe ingenuity of the Biafran (Igbos) as they were able to construct the airstrip which also was very instrumental in sustaining the pressure the Nigerian side (Umoh, 2011).He further maintained that, each time the airstrip was bombed, they repaired it in record time.

Tribal/Regional Supremacy and Abandonment of Mass-Destruction Bombs (Ogbunigwe)

It is a widely recognized truism that every sovereign state the world over is in constant quest for integration nationally, sub-regionally, regionally as well as internationally for the purpose of peaceful co-existence and unity amongst its contingencies—nationals or neighbours, which is a *sine qua non*for the attainment and sustainability of national development (Udeh, 2017). This is not exception in the case of Nigeria as one of the sovereign states of Africa and the world in general. Again, Nigeria is a conglomeration of many ethnic nationalities, with Igbo, Hausa and Yoruba as the ethnic groupings (Adeosun, 2011) (as cited in Onimisi, Ku Samsu, Ismail, &Mohd, 2018), (Omodiagbe, 1992, and Adegbite, 2010) (as cited in Ayemoni, 2012); and (Mahmoud, 2016).Furthermore, the country is broadly stratified into North and South protectorate, and subdivided into a federal structure that was made up of three regions of the North, East and the West and Mid-west The aforementioned divisions, particularly, tribal and regional division entrenched a regional politics, and supremacy into Nigerian politics.

This therefore clearly amplified by the emergence of three regionally-based and tribally/ethnically sustained political parties of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Convention of Nigeria Citizens (NCNC), and the Action Group (AG) led by late Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto from the North, Dr. Azikwe from the East and Chief ObafemiAwolowo from the West respectively (Salawu& Hassan, 2011). This seeming

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backdrop introduced unhealthy prejudice, hatred, animosity, tribal/regional distrust amongst the various ethno-regional groups on one hand; and also amongst the leadership of the country on the other hand. Consequently, its adverse effects manifested in the unfortunate Nigeria-Biafra civil war in 1967, which lasted for an unprepared three years.

Interestingly, after the war, there was a national declaration of "No Victor, No Vanquished", and the popular 3Rs of "Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and Reconstruction" by the Nigerian Government led by Yakubu Gowon.Commendably, Gen. Gowon displaced a worthwhile leadership character by such national declarations, which were meant to heal the sustained injuries during the war.However, such national declaration was also pretentious as there was obviously "The Victor, and The Vanquished" after the war on one hand, and it was meant to fulfill all righteousness on the other hand. Similarly, Rev. Fr. Nathan Ndiokwere applauded such national declaration gesture on one hand; but questioned why the country did not go the whole hog and take advantage of the Biafran technological advances and integrate them (the scientists) into Nigerian research and development sector like U.S did with German and Japan (Ndiokwere, 2019).Thus, an answer to the above question may not be farfetched, but may be found within the ambit of the very nasty and concern statement by Gen. Gowon after the 1966 counter-coup in July, that "There is no basis for unity in the country" (Ndiokwere, 2019, p. 88). The above statement was the justification for the obvious ill-treatment of the defeated Biafrans after the war by displacing them from the formal sector into the informal sector of long distance trade network.

Furthermore, this led to the unjustifiable abandonment of the Biafran military technological initiatives like the different types of Ogbunigwe (mass-destruction bombs), such as theBeer Ogbunigwe(handgrenade), the Foot-Cutter Ogbunigwe(landmine), the Coffin Box Ogbunigwe(landmine), the Bucket Ogbunigwe, and the Flying Ogbunigwe(surface to air weapon) and other Biafranmade products (Umoh, 2011, p. 347) manufactured by the Biafran science and technology unit during the war. The science and technology unit was established by the Biafran army administrators and was popularly known as the Research and Production Unit (RAP). Through this department, experts, best brains, scientists, engineers, researchers, laborers, educators were assembled for national (Biafra) responsibilities. As a result, they were able to produce sophisticated weapons through mere scraps which sustained them all through the period of three years of the war.

However, the leadership of the country never saw vision of incorporating this group of amazing talents into the mainstream of Nigeria and re-establish them, set up committee of inquiry for national development purposes dueto tribal and regional sentiment and supremacy. Akin to the above, Ndiokwere (2019,p. 81) maintained that "the research and production unit of Biafran army was the best the Nigeria should have arrested first after the war and placed in a detention camp, in a safe custody for further interrogation, while

special commission of inquiryand investigation could have discovered; how they did it".He further blamed the abandonment of the Biafra-made Ogbunigwe on leadership failure, who due to regional sentiments and supremacy never allowed such amazing technological initiatives to see the light of day. Thus, he contends that, the Nigerian post war government was not wise in discarding with the Biafran war scientists and engineers.

Recommendations

Akin to the findings of the study, we hereby recommend among other things that:
Though, it is more half a century since the war ended, the arrowheads of such initiatives, might have depleted considerably, we are of the opinion that the

- Federal Government of Nigeria should re-visit Biafran War Museum in Umuahia, Abia State, set up special committee of inquiry in order to revamp it for technical military training/studies.
- The Government should be genuinely committed to the unity and integration of theNigeria peoples in acknowledgment of the fact that Nigeria is a pluralistic society and as such if well utilized remains indisputably her strength and beauty.

Conclusion

Obviously, the corporate existence of Nigeria has its etymological trace to 1914, when British government forcefully amalgamated various ethno-religious groups of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani into an entity called Nigeria through a British Colonial Governor, Fredrick Lord Lugardin 1914 for easy colonial administration.That therefore marked the origin of the unhealthy ethnic/tribal struggling in the country even after political independence in 1960, upon this, everynational interests are contested along regional and tribal lines. This therefore led to the formation of various political parties along ethnic and regional basis, such parties are theUnited Progressive Grand Alliance (comprising of NCNC and AG) and is southern dominated; and Nigerian National Alliance (comprising of NPC and NNDP) which is also northern dominated political.This further resulted in series of crises ranging the Kano Riot in 1953, the Census Crisis of 1962, the Federal Election Crisis of 1964 and the Coups and Counter Coups of 1966 that led to the Nigeria-Biafra civil war in 1967-70. Pitiably, after the civil war, the injuries and animosity that led to the war not only continued, but also led to the abandonment and non-utilization of the military initiatives of different types of Ogbunigwe, and other arms and ammunition manufactured by Biafran armyduring the war on one end, which therefore undermined indigenous development on the other hand.

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